JUSTICE AND THE OUTSIDER: JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS IN TRIBAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
Bethany R. Berger*
A quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe1 holding that tribes had no criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Since that time, the Court has progressively
limited tribal criminal, civil, and regulatory jurisdiction over those that are not
enrolled members of the tribe. While the decisions have a veneer of history
and precedent, their legal basis is extremely thin—so much so that Justice
O’Connor called a 2001 decision “unmoored from our precedents.” 2
This trend is one of the most important developments in Indian law. It
is the focus of sustained attention by scholars, tribes, attorneys, and
legislators.3 A decision regarding criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians spurred a congressional reversal in 1991,4 and the Supreme Court has
just heard arguments in a case addressing the nature of this legislative action.5
Congress, moreover, is debating a broader legislative fix as to civil
jurisdiction.6
Despite this importance, there has been little empirical work on the
workings of contemporary tribal legal systems, and even less on cases
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involving nonmembers. This Article begins to fill this gap. It examines the
Court’s decisions regarding nonmembers to reveal the non-doctrinal
suppositions about tribal legal systems that undergird them. It then tests those
assumptions empirically and theoretically to show the ways that they fail to
reflect reality.
The Supreme Court’s nonmember decisions, I show, are shaped by
two beliefs about justice and those considered outsiders to Indian tribes. The
first is that jurisdiction over nonmembers should be limited because tribes will
treat outsiders unfairly. Tribal courts according to this assumption are
unfamiliar places in which outsiders are at a disadvantage, characterized by
unwritten customs and traditions and bias toward nonmembers. Subjecting
outsiders to their jurisdiction, therefore, would contravene the “great
solicitude” of the United States “that its citizens be protected . . . from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.”7
The second assumption is that jurisdiction over outsiders and issues
shaped by outside influence has little to do with tribal self-government. Over
the twenty-five year period, the court has repeatedly affirmed the tribal right
to self-government. Self-government, however, has been defined according to
a stereotypical idea of what tribes are and what they need to survive. Because
of this, jurisdiction has been limited to control over tribal members and the
power to reproduce practices, such as hunting and traditional ceremonies,
understood as traditionally “Indian.” The power to regulate new disputes and
issues or to engage in the “commonplace” stuff of government, on the other
hand, is deemed largely irrelevant.
The remainder of the Article tries to obtain the “view from the
reservation” on these assumptions.8 The empirical part of the project seeks to
test the assumptions against the experience of nonmembers in the Navajo
Nation courts. With regard to the first assumption, the Navajo Nation court
system on its face might appear to be extremely vulnerable to the kinds of
“intrusions on personal liberty” the justices fear. The Navajo Nation has no
constitution, all of its judges are Navajo, and only one in six judges has a law
degree. The court, moreover, aggressively seeks to incorporate Navajo
customary in its procedures and decisions. Despite these characteristics, the
court is both numerically balanced in its decisions regarding nonmembers—
50% of nonmembers win when they appear before the court, and 50% lose—
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and qualitatively balanced, even in areas, such as child custody, employment,
and contract disputes, which might seem particularly prone to bias.
With regard to the second assumption, the Article examines the role
that outsiders play in tribal legal systems. This role is shaped, in part, by the
unique history of tribal courts, which typically came to reservations as tools of
acculturation and control rather than as means to address the needs of tribal
people. In light of this historical legacy, tribal legal systems have an uphill
battle both in tailoring their law to the needs of tribal communities and in
overcoming the perception that they are alien and hostile to tribal traditions.
Restricting tribal jurisdiction to tribal members both denies courts the
opportunity to respond to many of the most significant concerns of tribal
members and perpetuates the perception of these courts as inferior bodies
designed only for control of Indians.
Jurisdiction over outsiders is also crucial for reasons common to all
legal systems. Here, I build on the insight of law and society scholars that
formal legal institutions play one of their most important roles not in resolving
disputes to which community norms already provide a solution, but in
addressing new conflicts that challenge community norms in a way commands
the acceptance of the community. This is particularly true for tribes, which
must find ways to deal with foreign cultural and economic pressures without
losing their coherence as communities. Disputes involving outsiders and the
issues arising from the new kinds of commercial and domestic relationships
they bring with them, therefore, are exactly the kinds of questions that it is
most important that tribal legal institutions resolve.
The case load of the Navajo appellate courts confirms this importance:
despite the tiny fraction of nonmembers on the Navajo Nation, 21.2% of the
cases decided by the Navajo appellate courts over the last 32 years have
involved nonmember litigants, as have over 30% of the cases decided in the
last ten years. Without jurisdiction over such cases, the courts would not only
be denied jurisdiction over some of the disputes most pressing to Navajo
people, but would be forced to forgo their community-building role in forging
distinctly tribal solutions to distinctly modern problems.
Finally, jurisdiction over outsiders is necessary to protect the
institutional incentives for tribal judges to do their jobs well. In line with
work on the importance of role perception in judicial performance, I argue
that the good track record of the Navajo courts is a function of its sense of
self-importance as the institution that must resolve the full range of conflicts
affecting the Navajo people and do so in a way that expresses the ideals of
Navajo culture. This institutional pride leads the judges to carefully scrutinize
the facts, law, and morality of the issues before them to fulfill this institutional
role, and resist temptations to rule based on the status of the parties or political
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pressure. Denying the courts jurisdiction over outsiders and the issues they
raise would radically diminish both the judges’ sense of self-importance and
the impetus to take an objective view of Navajo practices. Despite the recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, tribal legal systems have and
will continue to have broad and often exclusive jurisdiction over many
disputes arising on reservations. Preserving and enhancing these judicial
incentives to fairness, therefore, is a matter of importance to both members
and nonmembers of Indian tribes.
Part One of the Article discusses United States Supreme Court
opinions regarding tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, showing both how
they diverge from legal precedent and the assumptions about tribes and justice
that undergird the decisions. Part Two presents findings regarding decisions
involving nonmembers in the Navajo appellate courts, showing the balanced
disposition of these cases, even in factual situations one would assume would
be particularly prone to bias. Part Three discusses the history of tribal courts
in general and the Navajo courts in particular to show the challenges to
legitimacy and potential for resistance this history engenders. Part Four
returns to my empirical work on the Navajo courts, and discusses the role of
outsiders in the development of tribal legal systems and legal systems
generally. In conclusion, Part Five argues for a reconceptualization of what
tribes are, what those considered outsiders mean for them, and their
importance as the Supreme Court and Congress consider jurisdiction over
nonmembers in tribal legal systems.
I.

Judicial Divestiture in the United States Supreme Court

Over the last 25 years, the Supreme Court has progressively whittled
away tribal jurisdiction over those that are not members of their tribes.
Scholars have devoted much attention to this trend.9 While they have reached
9
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varying conclusions of about the roots of the cases, they almost uniformly
agree that they are not accurate reflections of established Indian law
doctrine.10
Scholars have identified many potential justifications for these
opinions. One might simply dismiss this trend as racism or hostility to tribes.
More subtly, one can find convincing links between this trend and the colonial
project of the United States with respect to Indian nations.11 One can also
find congruence between the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence and its rulings
in other areas of the law. David Getches, for example, has pointed to the
extent to which the trend of ruling against Indian tribes corresponds with the
Court’s other tendencies of ruling to further state interests, protect
majoritarian values, and undermine special minority rights.12
But such insights do not fully explain why, within the same period, the
Court has been relatively consistent in protecting tribes and their members
from state and federal jurisdiction where tribes and their members alone were
affected. Nor do they explain why the four more liberal members of the
Court—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens—have often joined and
Indian law cases, not just the ones concerning jurisdiction over nonmembers, explains these
cases as part of the general tendency of the Court to favor state’s rights, disfavor “special
rights” of minorities and other isolated groups, and protect majoritarian values and
expectations. David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’
Rights, Color Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 277 (2001). L.
Scott Gould posits that these cases are evidence of a “consent paradigm,” L. Scott Gould, The
Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996),
while Frickey, in another article, argues that although this paradigm may be descriptive of the
Court’s rhetoric, it does not explain the normative underpinnings of the results. Philip
Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian
Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754 (1997). Alexander Aleinikoff’s recent book, SEMBLANCES OF
SOVEREIGNTY (2002), contains elements all of these approaches, drawing links between the
Court’s Indian law cases and its other cases in which the United States defined itself as a
colonial power, as well as current jurisprudence of the Court drawing lines between those
considered legal citizens and those who are members of a community without possessing
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sometimes led the charge to limit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. These
conflicting trends are best explained by justices’ assumptions regarding what
jurisdiction over outsiders means both for outsiders and for tribes. More
specifically, the decisions are rooted in a dual sense that tribal courts will not
be fair to nonmembers, and that jurisdiction over nonmembers, except where
such jurisdiction is necessary to protect practices perceived as traditionally
Indian, has little to do with the legitimacy of legal systems or tribal selfgovernment. In this section, I describe the developments that led to the
conflict over jurisdiction over nonmembers, analyze the cases concerning
nonmember jurisdiction and the assumptions behind them, and conclude by
summarizing the tribal jurisdiction that remains and the questions left
unresolved.
a.

Historical Background: Tribal Resurgence

Tribal sovereignty has seen a renaissance in the latter half of this
century.13 Mobilized by efforts to terminate their existence in the 1950s,
inspired by successful group action by African Americans, and aided by
federal policy initiatives regarding poverty and group rights, tribes
increasingly found ways to assert and exercise governmental power.
After initial resistance, Congress and the Executive largely supported
these efforts. First on a piecemeal basis by providing funding under
discretionary programs, then through legislation directed at tribes, Congress
has generally tried to enhance tribal self-determination.14 Together, these
tribal and federal actions have created a revolution in Indian country.15
These actions include both economic and institutional development,
each of which has had the effect of subjecting more nonmembers to potential
tribal jurisdiction.16 Tribes increasingly took over management of natural
resources and businesses on reservations, resulting in their employing,
contracting with, and leasing lands to nonmembers. At the same time, tribes
sought to develop tribal governmental capacity, increasing the sophistication
of their courts and exercising broader regulatory control over their territories.
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In the early part of the twentieth century, few tribes exercised
significant jurisdiction over non-Indians.17 Except for tribes such as the “Five
Civilized Tribes” of Oklahoma, which had long traditions of written laws, the
laws of many tribes were drafted and designed by federal agents.18 These
laws typically limited tribal jurisdiction to tribal members or to Indians
generally.19 Federal regulations governing federally assisted reservation
Courts of Indian Offenses did the same.20 But in the 1950s and 60s, tribes
began to focus resources and energy on development of tribal courts and law
enforcement. As part of this process, tribes began to amend their constitutions
and laws to provide for jurisdiction over all people in their territory.21 This
institutional development had many motives: practically, it responded to a
real need to prevent lawlessness and regulate economic activity on
reservations; symbolically, it asserted the relative equality of tribal courts; and
defensively, it helped to ensure that states and the federal government would
not seek broader jurisdiction to fill a perceived jurisdictional gap.22
These efforts got encouragement from the United States Supreme
Court in 1959. In Williams v. Lee a non-Indian trader sued a Navajo couple in
state court to enforce a contract arising from the sale of goods on the Navajo
Nation.23 The Court held that the state had no jurisdiction over the dispute:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the
right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that
respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the
17
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transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in this
Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations. Congress recognized this
authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so
ever since. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is
for Congress to do it.24
The holding that the plaintiff’s nonmember status was irrelevant and the
concern for the impact on tribal legal institutions if jurisdiction was upheld
provided strong judicial support for the development of tribal courts.
By 1978, about a third of tribal courts exercised jurisdiction over nonIndians and non-tribal members on their reservations.25 At that time, there
was relatively broad recourse to federal court to challenge tribal actions. The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) made most of the federal Bill of
Rights applicable to tribes,26 and until 1978 lower courts typically interpreted
it as creating a federal cause of action to challenge tribal actions that violated
individual rights.27 But relatively few individuals subject to tribal jurisdiction
challenged tribal actions, suggesting relative satisfaction with its exercise.28
Despite this experience on the ground, however, many non-Indians
were fearful and resentful of tribal authority. While some states and local
governments supported these tribal exercises of jurisdiction, welcoming the
assistance in the expensive task of policing vast reservation areas, others
joined the protests of non-Indians, in part to support their citizens, and in part
because of the perceived threat posed by these new assertions of governmental
power within their borders.
b. The Beginning: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
In 1978, the question of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was placed
directly before the Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.29 In some
24

Id. at 223.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 n.7 (1978).
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ways, the facts seemed well designed to illustrate the need for tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Mark Oliphant was a resident of the
Suquamish reservation that had gotten drunk and got into a fight with nonIndians residing in tribal campgrounds to attend the tribe’s Chief Seattle Days
celebration.30 When tribal police went to break up the fight, Oliphant attacked
them.31 Oliphant was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer and
resisting arrest.32 In response, Oliphant filed a habeas petition with the U.S.
District Court.33 After the district court had denied the writ, tribal police
officers observed Daniel Belgarde, another non-Indian, driving his pick-up
truck recklessly and speeding across the reservation.34 When the police
signaled to Belgarde to pull over he refused, and instead led the tribal police
on a two-hour chase that only ended when he crashed into a tribal police car
with which the police had blocked the road.35 One of Belgarde’s two
companions on this wild ride was Mark Oliphant.36 The police released
Oliphant and Brad Bray, the other passenger, but arrested Belgarde for
reckless endangerment and damage to public property.37 The police called
the Kitsap County Sheriff and the state police to the scene, but they declined
to take jurisdiction.38 Both incidents exemplified the kind of lawlessness that
occurred when non-Indians did not recognize the authority of tribal police,
and the need for tribal, rather than state or federal, jurisdiction to address it.
But other facts in the Oliphant case made it a dismal one in which to
test the scope of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Almost the entire
habitable portion of the reservation had been allotted and sold to non-Indians,
as a result of which non-Indians vastly outnumbered tribal members.39 The
30
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non-Indians, moreover, could not vote in tribal elections or serve in tribal
government. Although this extreme population imbalance was as uncommon
as it was bizarre,40 a worse case in which to argue for tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians could hardly be imagined.
The briefs of Oliphant and amici opposing jurisdiction41 encompassed
hundreds of pages. The Court, however, did not accept any of their legal
arguments,42 but instead created something wholly new in Indian law, the
principle that simply by incorporation within the United States tribes had been
divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
How, without any legal arguments that it was willing to uphold, did
the Court deny jurisdiction? It did so through a process that Russel Barsh and
James Henderson have aptly compared to Lewis Caroll’s description of the
Hunting of the Snark: “they charmed it with smiles and with soap.”43 By
patching together bits and pieces of history and isolated quotes from

members most recent BIA census found 173 members residing on the reservation).
40
See Brief of Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians et al. at 33-34, Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729).
41
The amici included the Attorney General for the State of Washington, the State of South
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Attorney General. See Objection of Petitioners to Motion of Governor of State of Washington
for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae (Jan. 17, 1977), Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729).
42
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U.S. at 206 (statutes and opinions “not conclusive on the issue before us”). Finally, the
Petitioners argued that jurisdiction over non-Indians would violate the Constitution, both
because such jurisdiction was not provided for in the Constitution and because tribal
governments, whose membership was based on descent, could not constitutionally exercise
governmental authority. But the Supreme Court did not base its holding on the Constitution or
suggest that there were constitutional objections to such jurisdiction. Indeed, its affirmation
in Wheeler that tribal authority was not subject to constitutional restrictions effectively
undermined constitutional arguments about the limitations on tribal jurisdiction.
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Russel L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 609 (1978-1979).
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nineteenth century cases, and relegating contrary evidence to footnotes44 or
ignoring it altogether, the majority created a legal basis for denying
jurisdiction out of whole cloth.
This approach categorizes the two thirds of the opinion in which the
Court discussed historic non-judicial assumptions about tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.45 The Court, for example, quoted Felix Cohen’s statement
that “attempts of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . have been
generally condemned by the federal courts since the end of the treaty-making
period.”46 But it elided the fact that this statement described what courts had
done after a certain period in federal policy, and failed to cite what Cohen
actually wrote about the scope of inherent tribal power. On this score, Cohen
wrote that originally a tribe “might punish aliens within its jurisdiction
according to its own laws and customs,” and that “[s]uch jurisdiction
continues to this day, save as it has been expressly limited by the acts of a
superior government.”47 While this omission might be excused as a mere
mistake, a failure to look at every page of a 662 page book, the Court had
before it two briefs quoting this language.48
This problem is even more glaring in the Court’s discussion of much
shorter documents. In 1834, Congress considered a bill to regulate the
Western Territory beyond the Mississippi to which it was moving eastern
Indian tribes.49 As the Court described the bill, “Congress was careful not to
give the tribes of the territory criminal jurisdiction over United States officials
and citizens traveling through the area,” citing portions of the bill that

44

For example, the Court relied on a single treaty in which the Choctaw Tribe requested the
right to punish white men within their limits as evidence of a commonly held assumption that
no such jurisdiction existed absent delegation, leaving for the footnotes the many other
treaties that acknowledged the right of tribes to punish non-Indians in footnotes. Id. at 197-98
& 197 n.8. Barsh and Henderson collect the many other such treaties in the appendix to their
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201 & 201 n.11.
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Id. at 199 n.9.
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provided for federal jurisdiction over these two categories of non-Indians,50
and the statement that such jurisdiction was required by the current “want of
fixed laws [and] competent tribunals of justice” in Indian country.51
Although the Report stated that non-Indians voluntarily settling in the area
would be subject to tribal jurisdiction, this fact appears only in the footnotes.52
Even more misleading is that Oliphant presented the bill as concerning
whether tribes would be granted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The
report, however, makes clear that far from granting tribal jurisdiction,
Congress saw itself as placing certain limitations on inherent tribal authority
over non-Indians, and assumed that absent such limitations a tribe had
“jurisdiction over all persons and property within its limits.”53 This
jurisdiction included even the ultimate punishment: the proposed bill did not
provide that tribes could impose capital punishment on American citizens—
this power was assumed—but instead simply limited this inherent power by
providing that where tribes sentenced citizens to death, the United States had
the power to pardon them.54 In addition, the 1834 Congress understood the
federal jurisdiction it had provided over federal officials and travelers as a
protection analogous to protections provided to foreigners in a strange land
under international law,55 not as a response to the lack of tribal jurisdiction.
And while the proposed bill said nothing about granting tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians outside these categories, the Report makes clear that
Congress believed tribes had such jurisdiction: “As to those persons not
required to reside in the Indian country, who voluntarily go there to reside,
they must be considered as voluntarily submitting themselves to the laws of
the tribes.”56 All of these statements are on page eighteen of the House
Report—the same page that the Oliphant opinion cited.57 But while the
opinion stated that the report “suggests that Congress shared the view of the
Executive Branch and lower federal courts that Indian tribal courts were
without inherent jurisdiction to try non-Indians,”58 the report actually shows
the opposite.
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Similarly, the Court cited an 1855 attorney general’s opinion that the
Choctaw nation did not have criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian, ignoring
the fact that the Attorney General stated that “it is certain that the Agent errs
in assuming the legal impossibility of a citizen of the United States becoming
subject in civil matters, or criminal either, to the jurisdiction of the
Choctaws,”59 so that the question was not whether the tribe had inherent
jurisdiction, but whether Congress had taken such jurisdiction away.60 It was
only because the Attorney General read the relevant treaties and statutes as
preempting tribal criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens that he held it did not
exist; with respect to civil disputes, as to which the treaties and statutes were
silent, he opined that such questions “appertained to the local jurisdiction,
whatever maybe the ultimate political sovereignty.”61 The remainder of the
Court’s discussion of positive sources of law follows this same pattern of
partiality and misconstruction.62
But then, as if to prevent readers from focusing too closely on the
holes in this historical lace, the Oliphant Court provides us with more smiles
and soap. The Court acknowledged that the historical documents are “not
conclusive of the issue before us” and then continues: “But an examination of
our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even ignoring treaty provisions and
congressional policy, Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress.”63 What
did these earlier precedents say? First, that Indian tribes "hold and occupy
[the reservations] with the assent of the United States, and under their
authority,"64 second, that upon incorporation within the United States, “their
rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished,”65 and finally that “any attempt [by foreign nations] to acquire
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their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be considered
by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.”66
How did the Court translate these intrinsic limitations on tribal
sovereignty into an inability to prosecute non-Indians that violated tribal law
on tribal land? By pointing to dicta in a concurrence by a single justice to the
Supreme Court’s 1810 opinion in Fletcher v. Peck67 that “the restrictions upon
the right of soil in the Indians, amount . . . to an exclusion of all competitors
[to the United States] from their markets; and the limitation upon their
sovereignty amount to the right of governing every person within their limits
except themselves.” Although Justice Johnson’s concurrences always
expressed radically different views on Indian law than the opinions of the
Court,68 the 1978 Court relied on this slender reed to hold that “the intrinsic
limitations on Indian tribal authority” were not restricted to these two hundred
year old restrictions on “the tribes’ power to transfer lands or exercise external
political sovereignty.”69 Rather, the Court held, simply by “submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes . . . necessarily give
up their power” to try and punish non-Indian citizens without authorization of
this power by the United States.70
The Court announced this rule with so little law to support it because
of its dual sense that tribal jurisdiction was just not fair to outsiders, and that
66
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the effort to exercise such jurisdiction was a modern upstart of little
importance to real Indian tribes. The opinion is infused with suggestions that
the exercise of such jurisdiction had little to do with traditional tribal power.
The first lines of the opinion question the status of the Suquamish government
as either tribal or governmental:
Two hundred years ago, the area bordering Puget Sound
consisted of a large number of politically autonomous Indian
villages, each occupied by from a few dozen to over 100
Indians. These loosely related villages were aggregated into a
series of Indian tribes, one of which, the Suquamish, has
become the focal point of this litigation.71
The government trying to assert its retained sovereignty is thus subtly
transformed into a federal creation with little claim to the historical
conception of a tribe. Similarly, control over a formal court system is
portrayed as a modern, un-Indian creation. Traditionally, the Court tells us,
“[o]ffenses by one Indian against another were usually handled by social and
religious pressure and not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was on
restitution rather than on punishment.”72 Both formal court systems and the
attempt to exercise jurisdiction over outsiders were thus creatures of the late
twentieth century, and had little to do with the traditional concerns of tribes.73
The doubt that tribal governments can exercise jurisdiction fairly
figures even more prominently in the opinion. The petitioners and amici
portrayed a “parade of horribles” should the Court uphold tribal jurisdiction.74
(Slade Gorton, who later became a famous modern-day “Indian fighter” in the
U.S. Senate, wrote the amicus brief as Attorney General of the State of
Washington.) While these specific allegations of unfairness do not figure in
the reasoning of the Court (and indeed the district court held that Oliphant had
thus far been afforded equal protection and due process in the matter75), it is
clear that uneasiness about tribal jurisdiction does much of the work of the
71
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Oliphant opinion. The Court held that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians
must be denied because of the “great solicitude” of the United States “that its
citizens be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty.”76 Tribal jurisdiction would cause such an intrusion on liberty
specifically because of the cultural and racial divide between those exercising
jurisdiction and those upon whom it was exercised. The court quoted an 1883
case regarding federal criminal jurisdiction over members of the Sioux tribe to
suggest that subjecting the defendant to the tribal court would extend
[O]ver aliens and strangers; over the members of a community
separated by race [and] tradition . . . the restraints of an
external and unknown code . . . which judges them by a
standard made by others and not for them . . . It tries them, not
by their peers, nor by the customs of their people . . . but by . .
. a different race, according to the law of a social state of which
they have an imperfect conception.77
The 1883 Supreme Court had not held that this cultural divide was an absolute
bar to federal criminal jurisdiction over tribal members,78 only that it was an
additional reason not to construe a vague treaty provision to repeal a statute
that clearly prohibited such jurisdiction.79 The 1978 Court, however, held
that these considerations spoke “equally strongly against the . . . contention
that Indian tribes . . . retain the power to try non-Indians according to their
own customs and procedure.”80 What was simply a rule of statutory
construction where federal jurisdiction over Indians was concerned, with
respect to non-Indians was used to justify a new common law doctrine
allowing the Court to deprive tribes of jurisdiction in the absence of any
statute or provision of law doing so.
c.

Reaffirming Tribal Control Over Tribal Members

While these concerns were sufficient to remove all tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, that same term the Court issued two other
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opinions insulating tribal actions concerning Indians from federal control. In
U.S. v. Wheeler, a companion case to Oliphant, the Court held that the Navajo
Nation’s power to criminally prosecute a member of the tribe was “part of the
Navajos' primeval sovereignty . . . attributable in no way to any delegation to
them of federal authority” and therefore did not trigger the Fifth Amendment
prohibition on double jeopardy.81 The Court was careful to distinguish
between this retained power over tribal members and power over
nonmembers, aspects of which tribes had “implicitly lost by virtue of their
dependent status,” and coined the term “implicit divestiture” to describe its
new doctrine with respect to jurisdiction over nonmembers.82
A few months later, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court
denied a tribal member the right to challenge a tribal ordinance that excluded
her children from tribal membership on grounds that discriminated on basis of
her gender in federal court. 83 Although the opinion turned on the holding that
the Indian Civil Rights Act only created a federal cause of action for habeas
cases and therefore applied to non-Indians as well,84 Oliphant had insulated
these non-Indians from much tribal jurisdiction. With hindsight, one sees in
these opinions two separate tracks regarding tribal jurisdiction emerging:
where such jurisdiction touched non-Indians, it threatened personal liberty and
was not essential to tribal self-government; but when it touched tribal
members only explicit federal action was sufficient to overcome the invasion
of tribal sovereignty.
d. The Middle Period: Colville, Montana, Merrion, National Farmers,
Iowa Mutual, and Brendale
Oliphant seemed to concern only criminal jurisdiction. The Court’s
emphasis on historical assumptions regarding criminal jurisdiction and
concerns for personal liberty suggested that civil and regulatory jurisdiction
would not be governed by the same rule. In addition, the Supreme Court had
upheld imposition of tribal taxes on non-Indians in 1905,85 and in 1959 had
81
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held that a contract action by a non-Indian against an Indian could only be
brought in tribal court.86 The year after Oliphant was decided, moreover, the
Court in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation
upheld tribal taxes on non-Indians purchasing cigarettes on tribal land, stating
that “federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing
power.”87
But in 1981, the Court decided U.S. v. Montana.88 Compared to
Oliphant, Montana was a low profile case. It was brought by the United
States as an action to quiet title to the bed of the Big Horn River, which ran
through the Crow Reservation, and which was claimed both by the State of
Montana and by the United States in trust for the Crow Tribe. This issue
occupied the first five questions presented to the Court by parties, and was the
subject of the bulk of their written arguments.89 The question of jurisdiction
to regulate hunting and fishing by non-members was a “corollary” to this
question, and only arose because the federal government sought a declaration
that tribal and federal laws preempted concurrent regulation of such activity
by the state.90 But the Supreme Court framed the issues very differently. This
was the first sentence of the Supreme Court’s opinion: “This case concerns the
sources and scope of the power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and
fishing by non-Indians on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by
non-Indians.”91
Montana addressed head on a question that had only been part of the
subtext of Oliphant case: how should the Court respond to non-Indian land
ownership on Indian reservations. In the latter part of the nineteenth century
and the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States pursued a policy
of allotting reservation land in parcels of up to 160 acres to Indian heads of
autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an attribute of its government until
agreement of the nation itself or by the superior power of the republic it is taken from it.”
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905).
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households, and selling off the remaining land to non-Indian purchasers.92
This policy first became coercive, broad-based law with the Indian General
Allotment Act of 1887,93 but had been pursued by the federal government for
many years through treaties providing that land could be provided to heads of
households in severalty if they chose. Although the policy was intended to
civilize Indians by turning them into farmers and property owners, it “quickly
proved disastrous for the Indians.”94 In 1934, Congress declared the end of
allotment, and prohibited any further division of Indian lands. But the policy
had already wreaked havoc on the tribal landscape. Two thirds of Indian
lands had passed from native ownership.95 Most reservations were now
“checkerboards,” dominated by squares of land (so called “fee lands”) owned
and occupied by non-Indians.
In response to this problem, Congress took early steps to try to
reconsolidate tribal land holdings on such reservations96 and affirm uniform
federal jurisdiction over them.97 The Supreme Court had affirmed these steps,
holding that the federal sale of lands within a reservation, without more,
neither diminished the reservation,98 nor gave states criminal99 or taxing
jurisdiction100 over the people there. Even before these congressional actions,
the Court and the Executive had affirmed tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians
on allotted land on reservations. In 1904, the Court had affirmed federal
responsibility to enforce tribal tax laws against non-Indians on non-Indian
lands within the reservation.101 In so doing, the Court followed executive
branch opinions stating that even when non-Indians purchased land pursuant
to federal laws they did so “with the assumption that the purchaser, if he
wishes to occupy, will comply with the local laws, just as in other cases. The
United States might sell lands which it holds in a State, but it would be a
strange contention that this gave the purchaser any immunity from local laws
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or local taxation.”102 In 1934, in its influential opinion on the “Powers of
Indian Tribes,” the Solicitor General made clear that tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians on lands they owned was not limited to the power to tax:
Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as well
as the rights of a local government, dominion as well as
sovereignty. But over all the lands of the reservation, whether
owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the
tribe has the sovereign power of determining the conditions
upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to
reside therein, and to do business, provided only such
determination is consistent with applicable Federal laws and
does not infringe any vested rights of persons now occupying
reservation lands under lawful authority.103
After the 1960s, however, assertions of tribal jurisdiction raised new protests
by non-Indian residents who felt subjection to the rules of unfamiliar tribal
governments violated their rights as property owners and citizens.
Although the Court’s opinion in Montana did not accord with the prior
executive branch opinions, it still seemed to strike a middle ground in
resolving the dispute between tribes and non-Indians. The Court affirmed
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribally owned land:
The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the
Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the tribe, and
with this holding we can readily agree. We also agree . . . that
if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands,
it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing
bag and creel limits.104
It addition, the Court stated that the treaty with the tribe, which provided that
the reservation would be “set aside for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation” of the Indians arguably conferred authority to control hunting and
fishing on such lands.105 But the Court reached an opposition conclusion with
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respect to fee lands. Although the Court produced no history of assumptions
regarding authority to regulate activities of tribal members comparable to that
in Oliphant, the Court relied on Oliphant and Justice Johnson’s concurrence in
Fletcher v. Peck to hold that the same principles “support the general
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend
to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”106
Given the history of federal affirmation of tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-members, the Court had to acknowledge that tribes retained significant
inherent jurisdiction over non-Indians, even on fee lands:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may
also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.107
This jurisdiction seemed quite expansive. After all, the power to legislate to
protect health or welfare of one’s citizens is the core of the police powers of a
state—a broad power that traditionally has been granted “great latitude.”108
As described in the edition of the Cohen Handbook that came out in 1982, the
case seemed only stand for the unproblematic principle that tribes did not have
the power to regulate non-Indians on non-Indian land “when no tribal interests
were directly affected.”109
But in hindsight, the opinion contains some troubling suggestions as to
how tribal interests would be defined. While Congress and tribes were
increasingly defining tribal sovereignty as a modern, dynamic thing, the
Montana majority seemed to define tribal sovereignty as the creature of a
remembered past.110 The Court began its description of the facts of the case
by stating that “[t]he Crow Indians originated in Canada,” and had migrated to
the United States 300 years ago.111 The fact that the State of Montana had
106
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traditionally exercised “near exclusive” jurisdiction over hunting and fishing
on fee lands on the reservation, and that, until recently, the tribe had
“accommodated itself” to this state regulation was core to the Court’s holding
that tribal regulation did not impact the self-government of the tribe.112 In
addition, although this fact was important principally in construing the treaty,
the Court found that “the Crows were a nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on
buffalo, and fishing was not important to their diet or way of life.”113 The
Court did not consider the fact that the tribe now sought jurisdiction over
natural resources on the reservation as a means to revitalize its government
and the reservation economy; all that was important was that it had not done
so in the past. The Montana Court seemed to define self-government
according to its sense of what tribes had been, not what they could become.
But the Supreme Court’s cases over the next few years did not follow
this lead, and instead protected tribal sovereignty as an evolving thing. In
1982, the Court prohibited a state from taxing a non-Indian contractor
building an on reservation school in part because it would undermine the
modern federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.114 The next year,
the Court held that where a tribe had undertaken substantial development of
hunting and fishing resources on its reservation, not only could it regulate
such activity by nonmembers,115 but also that state regulation of hunting and
fishing was preempted.116
The nonmember jurisdiction cases of these middle years also
encouraged cautious optimism about the limited scope of Montana. When the
Court issued its opinion in Montana, it had before it Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, a case in which non-Indians challenged tribal authority to
impose a tax on oil and gas production on lands leased to them by the Tribe
for that purpose.117 If Montana stood for the proposition that tribal power to
regulate non-Indians derived from the power to exclude, as the Merrion
petitioners argued, their long-term leases allowing them to enter the land
would seem to deprive the tribe of regulatory power.118 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and upheld the taxes. The Court explained that
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The power to tax . . . does not derive solely from the Indian
tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands.
Instead, it derives from the tribe's general authority, as
sovereign, to control economic activity within its
jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing
governmental services by requiring contributions from
persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities
within that jurisdiction.119
Even if the authority to tax did derive solely from the power to exclude,
moreover, the tribe had not “abandoned its sovereign powers simply because
it [had] not expressly reserved them in a contract.”120
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist joined. Although the tribal taxes were lower than state
taxes for the same activity, the dissent centered around concern for the nonIndian plaintiffs subject to the vagaries of tribal jurisdiction. Non-Indians
were not represented in tribal governments,121 and tribal governments were
not bound by the constitution.122 Non-Indians contracting with the tribe might
find themselves subject to taxes when the contract was half completed.123
Although the majority had held that secretarial approval of the Jicarilla taxes
mitigated the potential for discrimination, the dissenters stated that “ignoring
the risk of such unfair treatment” for this reason was to “equate the unbridled
discretion of a political appointee with the protection afforded by the rules of
law. . . Neither wealth, political opportunity, nor past transgressions can
justify denying any person the protection of law.”124 But these dissenters did
not carry the day—the opinion of Justice Marshall, the Court’s strongest
advocate for the rights of minorities, did that.125
The question of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians also came before
the Court in National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe.126 The
case concerned a personal injury action by a tribal member filed in tribal court
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against a state school district and its insurance company for an accident on
land owned by the State of Montana within the Crow Reservation. The nonIndian defendants filed a federal action challenging the tribe’s jurisdiction
over them. The Supreme Court held that non-Indians challenging civil
jurisdiction of tribal courts were required to exhaust tribal remedies before
turning to federal court:
If we were to apply the Oliphant rule here, it is plain that any
exhaustion requirement would be completely foreclosed
because federal courts would always be the only forums for
civil actions against non-Indians.
For several reasons,
however, the reasoning of Oliphant does not apply to this case.
First, although Congress' decision to extend the criminal
jurisdiction of the federal courts to offenses committed by nonIndians against Indians within Indian Country supported the
holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation granting
the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between
Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian reservation.
Moreover, the opinion of one Attorney General on which we
relied in Oliphant, specifically noted the difference between
civil and criminal jurisdiction. . . . “By all possible rules of
construction the inference is clear that jurisdiction is left to the
Choctaws themselves of civil controversies arising strictly
within the Choctaw Nation."127
The Court concluded that
[T]he answer to the question whether a tribal court has the
power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over nonIndians in a case of this kind is not automatically foreclosed, as
an extension of Oliphant would require. . . . Rather, the
existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require
a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which
that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as
well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and
administrative or judicial decisions.128
127
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Two years later, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, the Court
affirmed this exhaustion requirement and extended it to cases founded on
diversity jurisdiction.129 The Court also went even further in affirming tribal
jurisdiction than it had in National Farmers: “Tribal authority over the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal
sovereignty. . . Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or
federal statute.”130 Only Justice Stevens dissented from the opinion, and only
on the grounds that exhaustion of state remedies would not have been required
had a diversity case been brought in state court.131
Iowa Mutual, following National Farmers and Merrion, seemed to
signal that while civil jurisdiction on fee land was subject to certain
limitations, these limitations were narrow, and the general presumption was
that tribes had civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations. In
1989, however, the Court issued its opinion in Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of Yakima,132 which considered whether the Yakima Nation
could impose its zoning requirements on reservation fee lands owned by
nonmembers. Eighty percent of the reservation was held in trust for the tribe,
while twenty percent was fee land owned by non-Indians. Most of the fee
land was at the edges of the reservation, which had significant commercial
and residential development.133 The parties referred to this land as the “open
area.”134 In contrast, the “closed area” toward the center of reservation was
almost entirely in trust, was largely uninhabited, and had maintained a
“pristine, wilderness-like character.”135 Philip Brendale136 owned a twenty129
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were also enrolled members, and from them to Brendale. Despite his Yakima descent,
Brendale was not himself a member of the Nation. Brief of Philip Brendale, Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), Nos. 87-1622, 87-1697 and 871711 at 3. But the tribe and the federal government were equally responsible for reinforcing
the distinction between members and nonmembers. In order to preserve the character of the
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acre parcel in this closed area, which he proposed to divide into ten 2-acre lots
to be sold as summer cabin sites.137 Stanley Wilkinson, a non-Indian, owned a
32-acre parcel in the open area, which he proposed to develop in 20 lots for
family homes.138 As in Montana, although the case was originally brought to
seek a declaration that the County’s zoning laws were preempted by
conflicting tribal law, it quickly turned into a question of whether the tribe had
the right to zone the property at all.
The case deeply fractured the Court. The Court issued three opinions,
none of which commanded a majority. Different majorities of five justices
upheld tribal jurisdiction as to Brendale’s land,139 and rejected it as to
Wilkinson’s.140 No opinion gained a majority as to its reasoning. The
decisions, therefore, have no precedential value. Rather, the case is important
because it signals the contested visions of sovereignty that figure in later
cases.
Justice White, joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, would not have upheld zoning jurisdiction over either parcel of
land.
This opinion, for the first time, stated that Montana expressed a
“general principle”141 against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers and that the
situations in which tribes had jurisdiction on fee lands were “exceptions” to
the general rule.142 The plurality would have these two “exceptions” function
not as expressions of the general right of a sovereign, but as a kind of legally
protected special interest that could be raised in proceedings of other fora.
Whether the proposed non-Indian activity had a direct effect on the tribe
would be evaluated on a case-by- case basis, not as a general category of
activity impacting tribal sovereignty. What should have happened in the case
at hand, according to the opinion, was that the tribe should have intervened in
the county zoning proceedings arguing that with respect to the parcels of land

had challenged this restriction on equal protection grounds, but lost in district court. Id. at
n.3.
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492 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor, J., announcing the judgment of the Court
in No. 87-1622 and concurring in the judgment in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711) & 492 U.S. at
448 (Blackmun, J, joined by Marshall and Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgement in
No. 87-1622 and dissenting in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711).
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at issue tribal interests were imperiled.143 Only then would the district court
have authority to review the question. This process had been followed in the
Wilkinson case. Justice White’s opinion did not further review the district
court’s findings that the proposed use would not threaten the tribe, but simply
affirmed it. As county zoning proceedings had not yet been completed with
respect to the Brendale parcel, the plurality opined, the district court should
not have exercised jurisdiction. The plurality would therefore have vacated
the finding of tribal jurisdiction in the case.144
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O’Connor, wrote an opinion
concurring in the judgment on the Wilkinson parcel, and announcing the
opinion of the Court upholding tribal jurisdiction over the Brendale parcel.
Justice Stevens’ proposed solution seemed to be motivated by two concerns:
the concern for fairness to nonmembers subject to tribal power, and the
concern that tribes be able to maintain their “traditional character.”145 Thus,
while Stevens found it “difficult to imagine a power that follows more
forcefully from the power to exclude than the power to require that
nonmembers . . . not disturb the traditional character of the reserved area,”146
he found it “equally improbable that Congress [in selling reservation land to
non-Indians] envisioned that the Tribe would retain its interest in regulating
the use of vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice
in setting tribal policy.”147 This balance would support comprehensive tribal
zoning jurisdiction over the closed area:
By maintaining the power to exclude nonmembers from
entering all but a small portion of the closed area, the Tribe has
preserved the power to define the essential character of that
area. In fact, the Tribe has exercised this power, taking care
that the closed area remains an undeveloped refuge of cultural
and religious significance, a place where tribal members "may
camp, hunt, fish, and gather roots and berries in the tradition of
their culture."148
With respect to the open area, however, time had “produced an integrated
community that is not economically or culturally delimited by reservation
143
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boundaries” and was no longer “a unique tribal asset.”149 “As a result, the
Tribe’s interest in preventing inconsistent uses is dramatically curtailed.”150
While the tribe “of course” retained the power to regulate trust land in the
area, it could not regulate Wilkinson’s fee land.151
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred
in the judgment that the tribe could zone the Brendale parcel, but would have
held that the tribe had inherent and exclusive power to zone all reservation
lands. Blackmun’s opinion was a stinging criticism of both plurality opinions.
First, the opinion pointed out that with “no more than a perfunctory
discussion” Justice White had elevated the Montana decision to “a general
rule, modified only by two narrow exceptions,” that tribes had no authority
over non-Indians on their reservations “absent express congressional
delegation.”152 This general rule was all the more “remarkable” given its
anomalous nature: “except for those few aspects of sovereignty recognized in
the Cherokee Cases as necessarily divested, the Court only once prior to
Montana (and never thereafter) has found an additional sovereign power to
have been relinquished upon incorporation.”153 With respect to civil and
regulatory jurisdiction, Blackmun wrote, the Court’s cases before and since
“clearly recognize that tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservation
lands is consistent with the dependent status of tribes.”154 In light of these
cases and in light of Montana’s explicit recognition of inherent tribal
jurisdiction on fee land in certain circumstances, Montana should be read “to
recognize that tribes may regulate the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians
whenever a significant tribal interest is threatened or directly affected.”155
White’s case by case approach to the second Montana “exception,” moreover,
essentially a “newfangled federal nuisance type cause of action” for injunction
of particular land uses, would destroy the tribe’s ability to engage in “longterm, active management of land use” that was the “essence of zoning
authority.”156
But while White’s opinion misconstrued the case law regarding
inherent sovereignty, Blackmun wrote, Stevens’ opinion “disregards those
decisions altogether.”157
Those decisions, including Montana, plainly
149
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recognized inherent sovereignty separate from the power to exclude nonIndians from the reservation.158 Nor was the hypothetical intent of the
Congress in passing the Dawes Act, which had been repudiated by Congress
and the Court, relevant to this inquiry.159 Practically, moreover, Justice
Stevens’ standardless distinction between open areas, in which tribes had
concurrent jurisdiction, and sufficiently closed areas, in which they had sole
jurisdiction, was even less workable than the approach of Justice White.160
Justice Blackmun also criticized the crabbed vision of sovereignty
Justice Stevens would protect. Stevens’ reasons for upholding tribal
jurisdiction in the closed area, he wrote, “betray a stereotyped and almost
patronizing view of Indians and reservation life.”161 Blackmun argued that
protection of tribal authority could not be limited to actions that would protect
a stereotypical past: “In my view, even under Justice Stevens’ analysis, it
must not be the case that tribes can retain the ‘essential character’ of their
reservations (necessary to the exercise of zoning authority) only if they forgo
economic development and maintain those reservations according to a single,
perhaps quaint, view of what is characteristically ‘Indian’ today.”162
Given the fractured nature of the Brendale Court, all one can take from
the case is that sometimes tribes can zone nonmember fee land, and
sometimes they cannot. Similarly, this middle period of the 1980s raised
more questions than it answered. Was Montana’s limitation on civil
jurisdiction on fee land an exception or a rule? Would the Court’s vision of
tribal sovereignty conform to the broad, dynamic understanding being
promoted by Congress and exercised by tribes? Or would it protect only those
exercises of sovereignty that conformed to historical stereotypes of tribes:
separate and self-contained, pursuing a culture and needs that were neither
related to non-Indian actions nor affected by them. Montana could be read
either way. Merrion, Colville, National Farmers and Iowa Mutual had all
suggested that tribes had broad civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, even on fee
land, as necessary to govern their territory and their people. The various
Brendale opinions decided none of these questions, but drew the battleground
for the future.
e. Congressional Rejection: Duro v. Reina
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In 1990, the Court took a step too far. In Duro v. Reina,163 the Court
determined that tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over Indians that were not
members of their tribe. Albert Duro was a member of the Torres Martinez
Band of Cahuilla Indians of California who lived on the reservation of the Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community with a Pima-Maricopa “woman
friend” and worked for the tribe’s construction company.164 He was charged
with shooting Biscuit Brown, a 14-year-old member of the Gila River PimaMaricopa Indian Community living on the Salt River reservation. After the
shooting, Duro fled to California, where the FBI arrested him and brought him
to the Salt River tribal jail pending trial.165 But the federal district attorney
declined to prosecute the case,166 so the tribe decided to prosecute Duro
itself.167 Duro filed a habeas action challenging jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court held that the tribe had no criminal jurisdiction over him.
The Oliphant Court had relied heavily on federal laws providing
federal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes on Indian land to find
a congressional belief that there was no tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The same federal laws supported the opposite conclusion with respect to
nonmember Indians: they referred to “Indians” generally, rather than to
members of tribes,168 and failed to provide for comprehensive federal
jurisdiction over crimes between Indians. Despite its reliance on these laws
in Oliphant, the majority held that laws regarding federal jurisdiction were not
relevant to the question of tribal jurisdiction.169
163
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While the United States, as well as many tribes and tribal advocacy
organizations filed briefs in support of tribal jurisdiction, no states or nonIndian rights associations filed briefs in opposition. This contrast with
Oliphant might be explained by the lesser concern of states for their Indian
residents, but is more probably the result of the jurisdictional alternatives to
tribal jurisdiction. The Major Crimes Act provides federal jurisdiction over
all Indians committing crimes in Indian country, but only covers serious
felonies such as murder and rape.170 And while the Indian Country Crimes
Act provides broad federal jurisdiction over all crimes between Indians and
non-Indians, it specifically excludes crimes between Indians from its
coverage.171 This exclusion is believed to preempt state jurisdiction over such
crimes.172 Tribal jurisdiction thus did not challenge existing state jurisdiction,
and filled a practical and quite likely a legal jurisdictional void. The Supreme
Court, however, held that the potential for a jurisdictional void was irrelevant,
a matter for Congress and not the courts.
Although the Court declined to be moved by policy considerations
with respect to the potential jurisdictional void, it is clear that other policy
considerations affected its decision to deny jurisdiction. First, while the
Court held that tribes retained the jurisdiction over nonmembers necessary to
“the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination,”173 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion reflected a stereotypical sense of what selfdetermination meant. This retained sovereignty was that “needed to control
their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and
social order.”174 The modern realities of tribal communities, in which
nonmember Indians like Albert Duro and his victim Biscuit Brown helped
shape the texture of daily life, were excluded from this vision of tribal
governments acting only to preserve unique customs untouched by time.
The Court’s concerns about the justice dispensed by tribal
governments complemented this limited view of tribal sovereignty. While
acknowledging that the federal government could constitutionally legislate
however, depends on federal preemption and tribal interests, while the question of implicit
divestiture, according to the Court, depends on federal assumptions.
170
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regarding Indians as a class, the Court emphasized that nonmember Indians
were citizens, and, like non-Indians, were “embraced within our Nation's
‘great solicitude that its citizens be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions
on their personal liberty.’175 The Court thus “hesitate[d] to single out . . .
nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that did not include them.”176
Tribes had additional powers over those who consented to membership, but
their criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was divested.
The dissent pointed out that neither consent nor a voice in government
were required for jurisdiction other contexts; the United States and the
individual states regularly exercised jurisdiction over citizens of other states
and countries within their borders—the only “consent” necessary was the
choice to break the laws while within their borders.177 In addition the dissent
argued that tribal members were also citizens and were entitled to the same
rights as nonmembers, and their consent to membership could not waive any
constitutional protections to which they were entitled.178
Rather than point to a legal basis for making the distinction between
members and nonmembers, the majority declared that the “special nature of
the tribunals at issue” justified its focus on consent and citizenship.179 Tribal
courts were “influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the
tribes they serve,”180 were often "subordinate to the political branches of tribal
governments," and their legal methods sometimes depended on "unspoken
practices and norms."181 It was also “significant that the Bill of Rights does
not apply to Indian tribal governments” and that the guarantees of the Indian
Civil Rights Act were “not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts.”182
While the Court cited Reid v. Covert for the proposition that the
“constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress to subject American
citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide
175
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constitutional protections as a matter of right,”183 the Court did not cite any
constitutional limitation on tribal court jurisdiction.184 Rather these allusions
to the constitution went to the Court’s policy-based uneasiness with tribal
power, rather than the legal basis of the decision itself.185
The Court confirmed that it did not see its opinion as having a
constitutional basis by inviting Congress to overrule it.186 Congress
responded with alacrity.187 In 1990, the same year the Court issued the
decision, Congress acted to address what it described as an “emergency
situation.”188 Although the legislation as enacted was to expire after one year
183
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Nor could it. Reid held that the United States was still bound by the United
States Constitution in trying Americans overseas, and that therefore it could
not try the wives of service men overseas without providing rights to
indictment by grand jury or trial by jury. The Indian Civil Rights Act entitled
Duro to the procedural protections he would have received in state court with
the exception of provision of counsel by the tribe if he could not afford his
own. More important, the Reid holding and its legal basis applied only to the
federal government. Military tribunals exercise jurisdiction as arms of the
federal government, and therefore are bound by all of the constitutional
restrictions on its power. See US v Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320-31 (1978).
Other sovereigns, even when they exercise jurisdiction within the boundaries
of the United States, are not bound by these restrictions absent an independent
constitutional provision. Thus even states, despite the incorporation of most
of the Bill of Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, are not bound by the
grand jury requirement in indicting defendants for capital crimes. See
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Without overruling its decisions
that tribes are not bound by the constitution and do not exercise criminal
jurisdiction as arms of the federal government, the Court could not hold that
Reid or its reasoning applied to tribal prosecutions.
185
186

495 U.S. at 698 (“If the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the
practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the problem is
Congress, which has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs.”). The Supreme Court is the
final authority on the meaning of the United States Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
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to provide more time to study the issue,189 the subsequent Congress made the
legislation permanent. Congress described the Duro opinion as “[r]eversing
two hundred years of the exercise by tribes of criminal misdemeanor
jurisdiction over all Indians residing on their reservations,” an exercise which
“[t]hroughout the history of this country . . . Congress has never
questioned.”190 This break with precedent had created a jurisdictional void,
and tribal courts were the most appropriate fora to fill it.191
To address this void, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act.
As originally enacted, the Act had defined Indian tribes’ “powers of selfgovernment” as including “all governmental powers possessed by an Indian
tribe” and its various branches.192 The so-called “Duro Fix” supplemented
this definition by adding “and means the inherent power of Indian tribes,
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”193 While circuit court judges have disagreed on the legal effect of
this provision,194 and the Supreme Court is reviewing this conflict this term,195
it is clear that Congress firmly rejected the Court’s vision of tribal jurisdiction.
f. To the Present: Strate, Hicks, and Atkinson
One might think that this Congressional rebuke would make the Court
reevaluate whether its tribal jurisdiction opinions in fact reflect federal
common law. But after Duro the Court lost its strongest advocates for tribal
sovereignty. Justice Brennan retired in 1990 and was replaced by Justice
Souter. Justice Marshall, in ill health, retired in 1991 and was replaced by
Justice Thomas. Justice Blackmun retired in 1994 and was replaced by
Justice Breyer. While Justice White, who retired in 1993, was no friend to
tribal sovereignty, his replacement, Justice Ginsburg is little better.
That Justice Thomas has continuously voted against tribal rights is not
surprising; it is well in line with his pattern of favoring state rights and
189
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disfavoring minority group rights. That the liberal wing of the Court has often
joined him in cases involving nonmembers, and in particular that Justices
Souter and Ginsburg have helped to lead it on the campaign to take away
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, takes more explanation.
Part of the explanation may be that these new justices are simply not
familiar with Indian law. David Getches in analyzing the internal memoranda
of the justices identified a sense that there was no coherent body of Indian
law, leaving the field free for them to impose their policy preferences in
decision-making.196 In particular, the justices appointed in the 1990s were not
there during the making of the implicit divestiture cases, and may have
believed that Oliphant did not emerge fully formed in 1978 but instead
reflected longstanding principles of Indian law. In addition, the opinions of
Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and even Stevens have more recently taken the
Court to task for not faithfully following its Indian law precedents,197
suggesting that they may have benefited from some on-the-job-training.198
But unfamiliarity with the law cannot be the only explanation; judges
are charged with familiarizing themselves with unfamiliar laws. Rather, I
believe, the new members of the liberal wing of the Court have so easily
joined the campaign against tribal jurisdiction precisely because, as for Justice
Stevens, they are the liberal wing. For them, tribal jurisdiction is subjection
to an unfamiliar government, one with different rules, designed for a different
culture, in which nonmembers have no voice and are at a disadvantage. For
the same reason, tribes are the bearers only of the same crabbed sort of
sovereignty reflected in Justice Stevens’ Brendale opinion—a sovereignty that
is to be protected when it affects tribal members alone, or allows tribes to
protect a traditional, insular culture, but that does not adequately serve tribes
when they act as modern, changing governments.
In this transformed Court, Justice O’Connor has been the most
consistent vote for following existing Indian law precedent. She has been a
strong advocate, for example, for the unique canons of construction applicable
196
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to Indian law cases,199 drafting the Court’s opinion in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians200 in which the canons were deployed to protect
off-reservation hunting and fishing rights, and dissenting from Justice
Breyer’s opinion in Chickasaw Nation v. United States construing federal law
to allow certain excise taxes on tribal gaming businesses on the grounds that
the canons did not permit this construction.201 Having grown up on a ranch in
Arizona, she is more familiar than most justices with Indian tribes.202 In
addition, her tendency to rule with awareness of the effect of law on
communities as well as individuals203 sometimes leads her to rule to protect
tribal communities as well. But even her protection of tribal communities has
often been limited to tribal actions that fit a stereotypical idea of the tribe.
Thus, while Mille Lacs upheld traditional hunting and fishing rights, Justice
O’Connor joined Justice Stevens’ opinion arguing for tribal zoning
jurisdiction only over the closed area of the Yakima Nation, and has not
faithfully applied the canons of construction in reservation diminishment
cases where she found that the areas in question had lost their “Indian
character.”204
This transformed Court has been disastrous for questions of tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers. In 1997 the first case concerning such
jurisdiction came before the newly composed Court.205 Strate v. A-1
Contractors involved a personal injury suit brought in tribal court by a nonIndian woman against a non-Indian contractor arising from an accident on a
highway running through the reservation of the Three Affiliated Tribes of
North Dakota. The plaintiff, Gisela Fredericks, was the widow of a tribal
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member, the mother of several tribal members,206 and resided on the
reservation. The defendants, Lyle Stockert and his employer A-1 Contractors,
were on the reservation pursuant to a building contract with the tribe. The
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, held
that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over the case.
The opinion sweepingly declares, “Our case law establishes that,
absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction
over the conduct of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances.”207
Although Iowa Mutual held that civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
reservations “presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute,” the Court engaged in
a tortured interpretation of the sentence, declaring it to mean no more than that
where federal law had granted tribes power to regulate activities of
nonmembers on reservations, tribal courts also had the power to adjudicate
with respect to those activities.208
The Court did “’readily agree,’” as it had in Montana, “that tribes
retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land.”209 But
then the Court tore a gaping hole in previous understandings of what
constituted tribal land. Although the highway on which the accident occurred
ran over tribal trust land, the tribe had granted the state a right of way for the
highway pursuant to federal law,210 had received compensation for the grant,
and had not maintained a “gatekeeping right” to prevent entry onto the
road.211 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, of course, concerned equivalent
land. There, the nonmember activities took place land leased from the tribe
pursuant to federal law, and the tribe had received compensation and had not
maintained a gatekeeping right over the leased land.212 But the Strate Court
concluded, without reference to Merrion, that this right of way rendered the
stretch of state highway “equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to
alienated, non-Indian land.”213
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The Court did similar damage to what it called the Montana
“exceptions.”214 Although the defendants had a contract with the tribe and
were on the reservation carrying out this consensual relationship, the Court
announced that there had to be a direct nexus between the particular
consensual relationship and the activity for which tribal jurisdiction was
sought. As “Gisela Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract, and the
Tribes were strangers to the accident” the case did not fit within the
consensual relationship exception.215 Only, the Court suggested, a party to the
consensual relationship litigating to enforce the terms of that relationship
could do that.
Nor did the situation come under the second exception, under which
tribes retained inherent jurisdiction over conduct that “threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.”216 The Court acknowledged that “[u]ndoubtedly, those
who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation
endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal
members.”217 While this would seem to be enough to satisfy the Montana
test, the Court held that it did not because “if Montana’s second exception
requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.”218 The Court
needed the second Montana test to remain both an exception and a narrow
one. To accomplish this, the Court narrowed Montana’s second prong by
holding that it implicitly incorporated language earlier in the Montana opinion
that tribes had only such inherent jurisdiction as was necessary to “protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”219 Jurisdiction over the
highway accident, it held, did not meet this test.220
In a footnote, the Court also casually undermined the exhaustion rule
established by National Farmers and Iowa Mutual. The Court declared that
“[h]ereafter, when it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal
governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana’s main
rule, it will be equally evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority
over disputes arising from such conduct,” and there would be no requirement
to challenge tribal jurisdiction in tribal court before doing so in federal
court.221 National Farmers, of course, concerned an accident on “land
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covered by Montana’s main rule,” fee land owned by the state. Again, the
Court ignored this inconsistency. In addition, by implying that it was
pointless to have tribal courts consider whether the Montana exceptions were
satisfied, the Court revealed what it was trying to do to the exceptions:
narrow them out of existence.
None of these results were required by the Court’s prior opinions, and
in many cases they did violence to them. Why then did the Court take these
steps? The answer lies in the Court’s view that, “requiring A-1 and Stockert
to defend against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an
unfamiliar court is not crucial to ‘the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes].’”222 Two related
ideas are embedded in this clause. First, non-Indians are at a disadvantage in
“unfamiliar” tribal courts, and so should only rarely be called before them.
The Court reinforced this idea by referring in a footnote to the rule that
nonresident defendants may remove cases filed in state court to federal
court.223 The second idea is that the need to exercise jurisdiction over the
“commonplace” stuff of government is not properly a tribal matter. To be
protected, the opinion suggests, tribal interests cannot be commonplace, but
must satisfy judicial notions of what is uniquely tribal.
In 2001, the Court further reshaped Indian law to deny tribes
commonplace governmental powers in Shirley v. Atkinson Trading Post.224
The case concerned the power of the Navajo Nation to collect a hotel tax from
non-Indian guests at a hotel owned by a non-Indian on fee land on the Navajo
reservation. As discussed above, the case law had suggested either that taxing
jurisdiction would not be subject to the Montana test or that if it was, it would
be found easily to meet the test. The Court in Colville had already stated that
“federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing power,”225
upholding taxes on non-Indians on trust land. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
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Tribe226 had held that tribes retained the power to tax non-Indian activities on
land from which they had no right to exclude as an extension of “the tribe's
general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its
jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services . . .”227
Atkinson, however, dismissed this language as dicta.228 The Court
stated that even with regard to taxing power, “we apply Montana straight
up.''229 “Straight up,” for the Court, meant not only applying Montana, but
applying it so narrowly that neither of the two Montana exceptions authorized
the tribal tax. Following Merrion, the Navajo Nation argued that by choosing
to avail itself of “the advantages of a civilized society” and governmental
services the tribe provided to businesses within its borders,230 on-reservation
businesses entered into consensual relationships sufficient to justify tribal
taxes.231 It pointed to evidence that the hotel benefited from police, emergency
medical treatment, and fire protection.232 But the Court held that the
consensual relationship must stem from "’commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements,’ and a nonmember's actual or potential receipt
of tribal police, fire, and medical services does not create the requisite
connection.”233 Why not? The answer is the same as that in Strate: “If it did,
the exception would swallow the rule: All non-Indian fee lands within a
reservation benefit, to some extent, from the "advantages of a civilized
society" offered by the Indian tribe.”234 The Court was apparently not
troubled by the irony that to avoid swallowing the Montana rule as it saw it, it
had cast aside the rule of Merrion that these same advantages justified broad
tribal taxing power over non-Indians on tribal land.235
In the same term, in Nevada v. Hicks,236 the Court pushed the
presumption against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers even further, holding
that even on tribally owned trust land, tribal courts did not have jurisdiction
over a suit against state officials alleging that they had violated his rights in
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searching his house. The state pursued the case largely to get a declaration
that state officials had official and qualified immunity in tribal courts.237 As
in Montana and Brendale, however, the Court took the case as an opportunity
to address wide-ranging issues of tribal inherent jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion followed the trend of minimizing
tribal interests where they conflicted with the interests of nonmembers. The
Court focused on the harm to state interests should tribes be able to limit the
execution of state process for crimes committed off the reservation.238 This
discussion was wholly hypothetical. State and tribal officials assumed that
tribal approval was needed for states to execute warrants on tribal lands and
had accommodated themselves accordingly.239 Indeed, in the Hicks case, this
accommodation was a boon to the state: after the tribal courts approved
execution of the state warrant, tribal police assisted the state wardens in their
search, and later provided evidence leading to the second warrant and
search.240 Nor did the case law support a finding of state jurisdiction in such
matters. The Supreme Court had persistently disapproved of state jurisdiction
over tribal members on reservations,241 and even with respect to off
reservation crimes, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits had suggested that states
were bound by the need to respect tribal governments in executing state
criminal process on reservations.242
In the absence of contemporary case law or facts supporting state
jurisdiction, the opinion relied on dicta taken out of context from opinions of
the late nineteenth century. First, the Court quoted language from Utah &
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Northern Railroad Co. v. Fisher, an 1885 case holding that the territory could
tax a non-Indian railroad company incorporated within the territory for its
activities on land withdrawn from the reservation. In Utah & Northern the
Court stated that “[i]t has . . . been held that process of [state] courts may run
into an Indian reservation of this kind, where the subject-matter or controversy
is otherwise within their cognizance.”243 But it is plain that by this language
the Court meant only state process against non-Indians on the land. The Court
had, a few years before, held that states had jurisdiction over crimes between
non-Indians on reservations,244 but had consistently excluded state power over
Indians. Indeed, in language conveniently not quoted by Hicks, Utah &
Northern acknowledged that full execution of territorial laws on the land
“would undoubtedly interfere with the enforcement of the treaty provisions,
and might thus defeat provisions designed for the security of the Indians.”
The authority of the territory, therefore, only extended to “matters not
interfering with that protection.”245
Hicks then quoted from U.S. v. Kagama, which, in holding that
Congress had the power to subject certain crimes between Indians to federal
jurisdiction, stated that the law “does not interfere with the process of the state
courts within the reservation, nor with the operation of state laws upon white
people found there. Its effect is confined to the acts of an Indian of some tribe,
of a criminal character, committed within the limits of the reservation.”246 But
the Hicks Court omitted the language that followed Kagama’s brief reference
to state process. In context, it is clear that the Kagama Court held that the law
did not interfere with state process because states had absolutely no
jurisdiction over the Indians there. The Kagama Court stated that, “Because
of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often
their deadliest enemies,” then cited Worcester v. Georgia247 for its holding
that “the state could not, while they remained on [Indian] lands, extend its
laws, criminal and civil, over the tribes; . . .the tribe was under [federal]
protection, and could not be subjected to the laws of the state, and the process
of its courts.”248 The Kagama opinion next cited Fellows v. Blacksmith,249 The
Kansas Indians,250 and The New York Indians,251 as additional support for the
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proposition that states had no power to enforce the law against Indians.252
What chutzpah to claim, as the Hicks Court did, that this testimonial to
immunity of tribal members from state law “suggest[s] state authority to issue
search warrants in cases such as the one before us.”253
On the basis of this ill-founded suggestion, the Court held not only that
states could exercise process on reservations, but also that “tribal authority to
regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off
reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal
relations.”254 State interest was the only justification for this conclusion: “The
State’s interest in execution of process is considerable, and even when it
relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the tribe’s self-government than
federal enforcement of federal law impairs state government.”255 (The
analogy was misplaced. While the federal government may serve federal
warrants in state boundaries, states have jurisdiction to hear actions
challenging the conduct of such federal officials. The analogous power,
however, was denied tribal courts, without analysis of the impact on tribal
self-government.)
While the majority opinion, without explanation, interpreted tribal
jurisdiction as dependent on the interest of non-tribal governments in freedom
from tribal authority, it is unclear what its effect on Indian law will be.
Although the Court held that tribal ownership of lands “is not alone enough to
support regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers” of the tribe, it agreed that it
remains a factor in the analysis, and “may sometimes be a dispositive
factor.”256 The Hicks majority opinion also emphasized that the “holding in
this case is limited to the question of tribal court jurisdiction over state
officers enforcing state law” and left “open the question of trial court
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general,”257 acknowledging that
actions by state officials unrelated to their law enforcement duties were
“potentially subject to tribal control.”258 Justice Ginsburg, who joined the
majority opinion, specially concurred to underscore this point.259
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, concurred to
urge the Court to go further still. Justice Souter would hold that land status
was not a “primary jurisdictional fact,” but was only relevant in determining
252

U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
533 U.S. at 363-64.
254
533 U.S. at 364.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 360.
257
Id. at 358 n.2.
258
Id. at 373.
259
Id. at 386 (Ginsburg J. concurring).
253

43

whether the nonmember conduct met one of the two Montana exceptions.260
Despite the fact that both Montana and Strate had “readily agree[d]” that
tribes “retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land,”261
he would read these cases to establish a “rule that, at least as a presumptive
matter, tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.”262 He would
hold that civil jurisdiction for on reservation activities “depends in the first
instance on the character of the individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed,
not on the title to the soil on which he acted.”263
It is plain that the perceived “special nature of [Indian] tribunals"264
motivated this reading of the case law. While Souter acknowledged that the
federal Indian Civil Rights Act imposed “a handful” of protections analogous
to the Bill of Rights on Indian tribes (in fact the law imposes almost all of the
Bill of Rights on tribes265), he cited the "definite trend by tribal courts" toward
the view that they "ha[ve] leeway in interpreting the ICRA's due process and
equal protection clauses and need not follow U.S. Supreme Court precedents
jot-for-jot."266 He also was concerned that “tribal law is still frequently
unwritten, being based instead ‘on the values, mores, and norms of a tribe and
expressed in its customs, traditions and practices. . . .”267 The resulting law
“would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.”268 The rule he
proposed was further confirmed by the “fact that ‘[t]ribal courts are often
‘subordinate to the political branches of tribal government.’”269 For Souter,
the “presumption against tribal-court civil jurisdiction” he advocated “squares
with one of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant, namely,
an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members be "protected...
from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."270
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Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred
with an opinion that the majority recognized as “in large part a dissent.”271
Although Justice O’Connor concurred in the holding that Montana governed
questions of tribal jurisdiction on tribal trust lands, she recognized that the
Court’s opinions had not been consistent on this point. She believed,
however, that establishing this rule was necessary to obtain coherence in the
Court’s jurisprudence.272 Given the contrary indications in the Court’s
opinions, however, she took the Court to task for failing to acknowledge the
significance of its holding.273
The rest of the majority opinion, she declared, was “unmoored from
our precedents.”274 Nothing in the case law supported the majority’s casual
decision that consensual relationships between governments, such as the joint
activity with regard to the warrant, could not fit within the first Montana
exception.275 The concurrence was even more damning with respect the
majority’s treatment of the second exception. The majority’s assertion that
not all state law was barred from tribal land did “not mean the tribal interests
are to be nullified through a per se rule.”276 If Montana was to “bring
coherence to [the] case law,” moreover, land status had to be a “significant
factor” in the analysis of tribal jurisdiction.277 Because state official action
might involve significant tribal interests, Justice O’Connor would remand for
determination as to whether the case satisfied the Montana factors, and
whether the state officials were entitled to official or qualified immunity.278
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, also wrote separately to
emphasize that the Court’s analysis of whether tribal courts had jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was “exactly backwards.”279 They
would recognize the question of a tribal court’s jurisdiction as one of tribal
law unless federal law dictated otherwise.280 With respect to Section 1983,
Stevens saw “no more reason for treating the silence in § 1983 concerning
tribal courts as an objection to tribal-court jurisdiction over such claims than
there is for treating its silence concerning state courts as an objection to statecourt jurisdiction.”281
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g.The Actual State of Things282
What is the law now with respect to tribal jurisdiction? Is the game
up? Far from it. First, despite judicial inroads on tribal jurisdiction where
non-Indians are defendants, well-settled case law establishes that for many
litigants, tribal court is the only option. Lawsuits arising on a reservation in
which the defendant is a tribal member can only be heard in tribal fora.283
Even where the cause of action arises off reservation, actions against tribes
themselves must also be brought in tribal courts absent a waiver of tribal
sovereign immunity.284 Despite the actions of the Supreme Court, therefore,
the number of cases in which non-member litigants appear in tribal courts will
only increase as tribes and their members become increasingly involving in
commercial and other relationships with nonmembers.
Even where defendants or subjects of tribal jurisdiction are
nonmembers, relatively little is clear. Hicks established that ownership of
land did not automatically provide for civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, but
gave little guidance on how questions of jurisdiction over activities on trust
land will be decided. The Court’s decisions acknowledging inherent tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians on trust land,285 as well as its suggestions that
federal treaties and laws setting aside land for tribes might constitute a federal
grant of jurisdiction,286 would seem to create a wide arena of protected
jurisdiction.
Even on non-Indian owned land, tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers
will be protected when the dispute arises from a consensual relationship with a
tribe or its members, or where jurisdiction is necessary to protect the right of
tribes and their members to “self-government.”287 What self-government
282
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means in this context remains relatively open. The Supreme Court has
decided questions regarding nonmember jurisdiction on an incremental, caseby-case basis, and has established few firm rules. Rather, it has acted in
accordance with its assumptions about what tribal court adjudication of
nonmembers means both for those considered outsiders and those considered
insiders to the tribes. The answer in both cases is the same: nothing good.
Nonmembers will find themselves at a disadvantage, and tribes will not
appreciably gain in self-government by the exercise. The remainder of this
Article examines these assumptions both empirically and theoretically.
II. The Experience of Outsiders in the Navajo Nation Appellate Courts
The empirical part of this project examines decisions involving
outsiders in the Navajo Nation appellate court. In my examination, I find that
the court is surprisingly balanced in hearing the rights of outsiders, even areas
that might appear particularly prone to bias.
a. The Navajo Nation Court System
I chose the Navajo court system for several reasons. First, it is the
court system I am most familiar with. Having worked for three years as a
lawyer on the Navajo Nation, I have litigated many cases in the tribal court
system, know many of the actors, and have a better, although still limited,
sense of the texture of life on the Navajo Nation than I do of most other Indian
nations.
Second, the materials necessary for the survey are both accessible and
sufficiently voluminous to examine. All of the Navajo Nation’s appellate
court opinions from 1969 to the present are now on-line.288 While several
other tribal courts also have opinions on line or in printed form, the Navajo
Nation publishes virtually all of its non-summary opinions, limiting the
problem of judicial selection biases. There are over five hundred of these
opinions, providing a broad enough sample to show valid patterns.
Third, the experience of nonmembers on the Navajo Nation is
disproportionately important in evaluating the experience of nonmembers in
tribal legal systems generally. With 13% of the total Indian population in the
United States and about one-third of the total land base over which any tribe
may exercise jurisdiction, the Navajo legal system potentially has jurisdiction
over a significant proportion of disputes regarding nonmembers arising on
reservations.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Navajo Nation figures
288

The decisions are available on www.versuslaw.com.

47

prominently in the debates and litigation concerning jurisdiction and nonmembers. Several of the Supreme Court’s most important jurisdictional
cases—Williams v. Lee,289 Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax
Commission,290 McClahahan v. Arizona,291 U.S. v. Wheeler,292 Kerr-McGee,293
and Atkinson Trading Post v. Shirley294—have arisen on the Navajo Nation,
and the Nation is an important voice in current discussions on the subject.
There are, of course, disadvantages in focusing on the Navajo Nation,
as there would be in focusing on any single tribe.
The United States
recognizes 562 Indian tribes.295 While some tribes, such as the various Sioux
tribes of the Dakotas, reflect federal divisions of single tribes,296 most have
different indigenous languages and cultures. Tribes also have vastly different
physical and social circumstances. While the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,
the most populous tribe, has over 300,000 members297 most tribes have fewer
than 1,000 members and many have fewer than 100. Their land bases also
differ widely. While the Navajo Nation is the approximate size of the State of
West Virginia or the Country of Ireland, and several other reservations are the
approximate size of my state, Connecticut, other reservations encompass only
a few hundred acres. In addition, 226 of the 562 tribes recognized by the
United States are Alaska Native Villages,298 whose land is not considered
“Indian country.”299 Generalizations are therefore dangerous.
The Supreme Court, however, has created general tests for tribal
jurisdiction. While it has left open the possibility that individual treaties and
laws may create different rules, in practice it has given short shrift to legal or
factual differences between tribes. The failure of one tribe, particularly one of
the size and significance of the Navajo Nation, to conform to its judicial
assumptions should make the Court more cautious in assuming a policymaking role with respect to tribal jurisdiction.
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In addition, all tribes struggle with the problem of establishing
legitimate and just governmental systems in the face of a history of American
colonialism. A close study of the challenges this poses to one tribal legal
system is therefore meaningful both for other tribes and for judges and policy
makers considering tribal jurisdiction.
The Navajo Nation, moreover, is a paradigmatic example of the kind
of tribal court system the Court is concerned about. While students of tribal
courts often look to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court as a model, in some
ways it seems a breeding ground for the horror stories about tribal court
systems. All of the judges, at both the trial and Supreme Court levels, are
Navajo.300 One of the qualifications for judicial service is fluency in the
Navajo language,301 effectively ensuring that judges will be drawn from the
more traditional portion of the population. A J.D., however, is not a
requirement for judgeship,302 and only a minority of Supreme Court justices,
and even fewer trial court judges, have been law school graduates.303
The court has also pioneered one of the bugaboos of those opposing
tribal court jurisdiction over outsiders, the incorporation of tribal customary or
common law in dispute resolution.304 Navajo customary or common law is
“comprised of customs and long-used ways of doing things”305 that gain the
status of law, like the Anglo common law catalogued by Blackstone.306 Since
the judicial reforms of 1959, the Navajo Code has provided for use of Navajo
customary law in legal proceedings,307 and judicial opinions have discussed
300
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custom since the Navajo Nation began publishing opinions in 1969.308 In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the justices of the Navajo Nation began to place
new emphasis on Navajo common law, applying it beyond the domestic
relations arena in which its use had always been sanctioned, to questions of
judicial review,309 personal injury lawsuits,310 and restrictions on freedom of
speech.311 Today common law is the “law of preference” in the Navajo
courts.312 The tribal common law movement is, at some level, a rejection of
Anglo-American standards as the best or most appropriate way to resolve
disputes arising on reservations, and the use of such customary law helps to
undergird the sense that tribal courts are unfamiliar, foreign places, where
those not part of the traditional culture will find themselves at a disadvantage.
313

One might also expect that because of the unique circumstances of the
Navajo Nation, adjudication of the rights of nonmembers would play a
relatively small role in Navajo law. The Navajo reservation is the largest in
the country. Unlike the vast majority of reservations, very little of this land
has been “allotted” or sold by the United States to non-Indian settlers. While
on heavily allotted reservations a substantial proportion and sometimes the
vast majority of residents may be non-Indian, Navajos compose over 90%
percent of the reservation population.314 Only 3.5% of the 145,843 people
(b) Where any doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the Tribe, the
court may request the advice of counselors familiar with these customs and
usages.
(c) Any matters that are not covered by the traditional customs and usages
of the Tribe, or by applicable Federal laws and regulations, shall be decided
by the Court of the Navajo Tribe according to the laws of the state in which
the matter in dispute may lie.
Ironically, this provision is in large part the product of federal influence—this language was
taken essentially verbatim from the federal code of regulations for tribal courts. As part of the
court reforms of 1985, the Navajo Nation reenacted this choice of law provision and modified
it to make clear that it applied in all cases, not simply civil ones, and that in cases where
Navajo and federal law was silent the court “may” not “shall” apply local state law. 7 N.N.C.
§ 204.
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living on the reservation are non-Indian, and only 6.5% are nonmember
Indians.315 And although Native Americans in general are the most
exogamous of American ethnic groups, a fairly small proportion of the onreservation Navajo population marries outside the tribe.
Navajo custom and tradition also remain deeply embedded in daily
life. The appropriate way to introduce oneself, for example, is to give not
only one’s name but the clans of both one’s mother, father, and grandparents,
acknowledging not only one’s individuality, but one’s traditional heritage and
relationships.316 While ensuring the vitality of the Navajo language among
younger members is a concern for the tribe, as it is for most tribes with living
languages, as of 1990 Navajo was spoken at home by 142,886 members of the
Navajo Nation,317 and it is still the only language of many Navajo elders.
The Navajo Nation is almost unique in its degree of independence
from non-Navajo society. Interactions with outsiders might seem to compose
little of the work of the courts, and to be relatively unimportant to Navajo selfgovernment. The Navajo Nation thus provides an excellent opportunity to test
the accuracy of the Supreme Court’s vision of tribes as largely isolated from
nonmembers and dedicated to preserving customs and culture unrelated to the
outside world.
b. Focus on Appellate Decisions
Written appellate decisions, of course, are not necessarily
representative of disputes in a particular society. Individuals transform only a
small fraction of disputes into articulated grievances and a smaller fraction of
those into legal actions; an even smaller fraction of those result in litigated
legal decisions and a yet smaller fraction result in appellate decisions.318
Although there is an intuitive sense that reported decisions reflect the
315
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See, e.g., Claudeen Bates-Arthur, The Role of the Tribal Attorney, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 21, 21
(2002). In beginning her remarks, Bates-Arthur provided her clan (which is her mother’s
clan), and the clans of her father and her grandparents, saying, “That is who I really am.” Id.
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Navajo Labor Relations, No. A-CV-08-87 (Navajo 10/08/1990).
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underlying activity in society, the relationship between activity, litigation, and
decisions is not so direct.319 Not all injuries are sensed as wrongs, and even
fewer as legal wrongs. Disputes litigated to decision are more likely than
others to involve “hard cases,” those in which both parties predict relatively
equal chances of success.320 In addition, as discussed further below, litigation
disproportionately reflects situations in which there is no common agreement
on the way disputes should be resolved, or in which the parties do not have
common social ground, resulting in a turn to formal legal institutions for
resolution.321
This lack of representativeness, however, is not a significant problem
for the study. While many disputes do not even come before the courts, it is
tribal formal legal institutions that have come under the scrutiny and criticism
of the United States Supreme Court. More important, it is perhaps more
relevant in determining the relative bias of the courts to see what they do in
adjudicating hard cases rather than easy ones. The indirect relationship
between disputes and litigated claims, moreover, only increases the likelihood
that disputes that are litigated reflect the friction points in society, the areas in
which parties feel themselves particularly aggrieved and need to turn to a
hopefully objective third party for resolution.
In addition, to the extent one can tell from the published trial court
decisions and discussions of the decisions below in the appellate court
decisions, the primary differences between trial and appellate level decisions
are not the extent of bias against nonmembers. While in some instances
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decisions against nonmembers below seem to clearly violate the law,322 the
differences between the trial and appellate courts appear to reflect different
visions of the role of the court rather than greater or lesser bias against
nonmembers. Thus while the appellate court has reversed decisions that the
Navajo courts lacked jurisdiction over claims against non-Indians, these
decisions appear motivated by the belief that the court has and should have
broad jurisdiction over all actions arising on the reservation rather than bias
against the nonmember.323 Similarly, the appellate court appears to have a
greater preference for the application of Navajo common law, and has
reversed decisions in favor of non-Indians where it held that state law rather
than common law inappropriately formed the rule of decision.324
c. Who Wins When Nonmembers Go Before the Courts?
Since 1971, the Navajo appellate courts have issued 513 written
opinions. Each of these was reviewed to determine which involved parties
that could be identified as involving nonmembers of the tribe, whether
because the opinion identifies them as such, because of the names of the
parties, because of knowledge of the parties, or because of the status and
location of the parties.325 Where the identity of the litigant could not be
determined to a reasonable degree of certainty, the case was assumed to
involve only Navajos.
Through this method, 109 cases involving non-Navajo litigants were
identified. Nine of these cases involve Indians that are not members of the
Navajo tribe, and the rest, 91.7% of the total, involve non-Indians. The cases
were read and categorized as to who won or lost the case and the subject
matter of the case. The cases run the gamut in subject matter: they include
322

See, for example, Deal v. Blatchford, 3 Nav. R. 159 (1982), in which the appellate court
reversed the trial court for granting punitive damages of $250 and compensatory damages
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cases regarding contracts, torts, child custody, employment law, practice of
law, trusts and estates, and taxation. The majority of cases involve nonIndian companies, whether as employers, vendors, alleged tortfeasors,
taxpayers, or insurers.
Out of these cases, in 16 neither party won or the results were too
mixed to say one party won or lost,326 in four non-Navajos were on both sides,
and in three non-Navajos and Navajos were on the same side. The remaining
86 cases were perfectly equally divided: in 43 the non-Navajo party won, and
in 43 the non-Navajo party lost. This radical equality would almost suggest
that it is intentional,327 except that the evenness of the decisions is only
apparent when the results are aggregated. In no five-year period except one
are the win and loss rates the same. But over the 32-year period the numbers
of wins and losses become equal. The results are shown in Table I.
Table I: Win-Loss Rates of Non-Members
1971198181
87
Nonmember wins
13
11
Nonmember loses
9
6
No party won or lost 3
7
or
results
substantially mixed
Nonmembers
on
both sides
Nonmember
and
Navajo on same side
326

198792
6
13
3

199297
7
7
1

1
1

1

19972003
6
8
2

Total

3

4

1

3

43
43
16

These included, for example, cases in which the decision simply reported that the matter
had been dismissed by stipulation of the parties, cases responding to requests for opinions on
certified questions, and cases in which the Supreme Court simply certified the presentation of
candidates for admission to the bar. They also, however, included a few substantive cases
such as Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000), in
which the court affirmed that the tribe had jurisdiction over a non-Indian employer and that
the employer had failed to create an atmosphere free from harassment, but reversed the
damages, civil penalty, and the award of attorney fees because it agreed with the employer
that requiring it to prove substantial justification for firing the employee by clear and
convincing evidence violated due process and that the civil penalty was improper for lack of
notice in the complaint.
327
It is widely believed, for example, that the Bureau of Indian Affairs Branch of
Acknowledgement and Research strives for numerical equality because the numbers of tribes
whose recognition is approved always equals those whose recognition is disapproved. This
kind of balance is plainly easier to achieve for the BIA, which has decided only about 25
petitions in the same period in which the Navajo Supreme Court has decided 513.
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Total
involving
nonmembers

cases 25

24

24

16

20

109

This kind of equality is evident across various kinds of cases. Whether
the issue is child custody, torts, contracts, or employment, Navajo litigants
win some, and non-Navajo litigants win some. This is true whether the court
is deciding on procedural or substantive grounds, whether the decision affirms
or reverses the district court, even whether the opposing party is the Navajo
Nation or not.
According to an influential theory developed by George Priest and
Benjamin Klein, this 50-50 win-loss rate is what one would expect from
litigated decisions.328 Assuming that parties have relatively accurate
information regarding their chances of success, they will settle cases in which
they agree that one party is significantly more likely to win. It is only where
the likely outcome is subject to a large degree of uncertainty, where each party
appears to have a relatively equal ability to win, that parties will go to trial.
Other factors being equal,329 therefore, one would expect the results to
approach a 50-50 win-loss rate for any set of parties.
But where judges are influenced by legally irrelevant factors such as
bias against a particular kind of party or claim, it skews the results. Parties
that make an accurate assessment of the law and facts in their favor will
nevertheless lose disproportionate numbers of cases. While Priest & Klein
predicted that parties would adjust their litigation decisions to account for this
bias, thus maintaining the 50-50 win-loss rate, subsequent studies do not
confirm their thesis.330 Parties appear to continue to rely on their assessment
that the law and facts are in their favor, and only very slowly, if at all,
effectively strategize to avoid a court biased against them.
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Indian law cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court provide a nice
example of this. David Getches has calculated the win-loss rate of tribes in
Indian law cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. He found that
while the win-loss rates in the Burger Court were relatively balanced, in
Indian law cases decided by the Rehnquist court (those since 1986) tribal
interests lose 77% of the time. It is only now, after almost twenty years of this
clear, extremely high profile trend, that tribes are actively seeking to avoid the
United States Supreme Court, and still find themselves often unable to do so
as opposing parties refuse to settle.331 Bias in lower level courts should be
even more difficult to detect and address through litigation behavior.
To summarize, the Navajo appellate courts are as likely to rule in favor
of nonmembers as they are to rule in favor of members. This figure suggests
that parties are able to make a relatively accurate assessment of their chances
of winning before the court, and that legally irrelevant factors do not
significantly influence the court’s decisions in ways that disadvantage
nonmembers. Indeed, a non-Navajo going before the Navajo Supreme Court
can be much more confident of winning than can a tribe going before the
highest court in the land. While not conclusive as to the “fairness” of the
courts, these statistics should at least provide some reassurance to those
concerned about bias.
d. Closer Analysis of Cases Vulnerable to Bias
Closer reading of the cases supplements the suggestion that the court is
acting in a relatively balanced manner. While not everyone would agree with
the reasoning or method of the court in every case (indeed almost by
definition each decision will disappoint a litigant who thought that he or she
should win) the cases appear uniformly governed by thoughtful attempts to
determine the relevant law, policies, and facts. There are some decisions in
which the court reaches questionable legal results, but the source of the errors
does not appear to be bias against the parties, nor do the errors
disproportionately disadvantage nonmembers. While I do discuss one
troubling custody case below, it appears that the basis of decision was Anglo
common law. In other cases, the status of the litigant appears to have made
the court particularly careful to ensure fairness.332
331

There were, for example, significant, but unsuccessful, efforts to settle both Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) and U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 123 S. Ct. 1079 (2003).
332
In re Practice of Battles, 3 Nav. R. 92 (S. Ct. 1982), for example, considered a challenge
made by William Battles to a new rule that required membership in a state bar for nonNavajos seeking to practice in the Navajo courts. (The rule is intended to ensure that the
courts will benefit from Navajo practitioners that either are educated in Navajo legal traditions
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To supplement the data, I will now discuss the decisions of the court in
three areas in which one might expect that decisions would be tainted by the
biases or unfamiliarity of the courts: decisions involving Navajo common
law, decisions involving commercial relations, and custody disputes involving
custody of children with Navajo heritage.
1. Non-member Decisions Involving Navajo Common Law
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the use of indigenous
common law as a justification for denying tribal courts jurisdiction over
nonmembers. It might also seem that such concepts would be relevant only to
disputes that closely resemble those the tribe engaged in pre-contact.333 An
examination of the use of one prominent Navajo common law concept, that of
nalyeeh, debunks the notion that indigenous common law need not and cannot
be fairly applied to contemporary disputes involving non-Indians. Indeed, in
this example, the use of common law adds to the fairness of the courts by

or can compliment their lack of knowledge of such traditions with knowledge of Anglo law
and a legal education that enables them to familiarize themselves with unfamiliar laws.)
Battles had practiced in the Navajo courts for several years and had passed the newly instated
Navajo bar exam two years before the rule was promulgated. When Battles sought to
represent an individual challenging an extradition agreement between the Navajo Nation and
the State of Arizona, however, the Navajo prosecutor sought to disqualify him based on his
ineligibility to practice under the rule.
In the words of the court, “Mr. Battles is a rather controversial figure. He passed the first bar
examination administered by the Navajo Courts, along with 79 other individuals. . . . The
following year Battles filed a $12.2 million lawsuit in our courts against Raymond Tso, the
prosecutor in this case. . . Later participation in controversial suits, proceedings and disputes
has made Battles a figure disliked by some, but neither the decisions of the District Court nor
this court are based upon Mr. Battles' notoriety.” The court held that Battles long practice in
the Navajo Nation courts gave him an equitable right to continue to practice there despite the
new rule. (During my time on the Navajo Nation over a decade later, Mr. Battles continued to
prosecute in the Navajo courts, and was even a Domestic Violence Commissioner in the court
system. He was also a presenter in the mandatory course on Navajo Common Law for new
bar members, where he regaled students with stories of his 12.2 million dollar lawsuit against
the Navajo Nation.)
333
Some tribes deliberately segregate the use of indigenous justice ways to more “traditional”
disputes. The Mohegan Tribe, for example, has two court systems, a Gaming Disputes Court
that hears cases arising from its successful casino and whose procedural and substantively law
closely mirror state and federal law, and a Mohegan Tribal Court, which hears disputes
concerning tribal members and which has more freedom to apply Mohegan common law.
MTC. The Navajo Nation does something similar with its Peacemaker Court, which hears
primarily family disputes and whose procedures, hearkening to traditional dispute resolution
methods, involve an attempt to obtain consensus through talking through of the problem with
the mediation of an elder. NTC.
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creating legal guarantees of justice in situations in which tribal codes have not
yet created them.
Nalyeeh is the traditional concept of making restitution for wrongs.334
The concept includes not only the payment itself, but the proper process for
negotiating and making payment.335 The focus is distinctly equitable:336 the
concern is not with the amount of damages, but on what kind and manner of
restitution is “fair,” so as to “fix the victim’s mind.”337 Although the concept
has long been part of traditional law practice on the Navajo Nation,338 nalyeeh
apparently first appeared in a written opinion in 1986.339 The case involved a
wrongful death action against the Navajo Nation by the mother of a Navajo
child who died after being hit by a truck driven by a tribal employee.340 The
Navajo Nation argued that that under Anglo common law there was no action
for the negligent death of a human being, so the right to bring such an action
must be provided by statute.341 Although most states have enacted wrongful
death statutes, the Navajo Nation had not. But the district court held that the
common law concept of nalyeeh, under which Navajos could seek
compensation for the death of a relative, allowed the action to go forward.342
In addition, although traditionally nalyeeh damages were paid in livestock and
goods, the court recognized that “[m]ore Navajos work for money today” and
“[p]ayment in material goods is no longer adequate.”343
Since 1986, the Navajo courts have used nalyeeh to resolve a range of
distinctly modern disputes, including election of remedies in worker’s
compensation cases,344 “stacking” of uninsured motorist insurance
coverage,345 and requests for prejudgment interest in tort cases.346 Seven out
334
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of the eleven cases concerning nalyeehnow on -line involve non-Indians,
mostly as defendants. In three of the seven, the non-Indian party lost. In
Bennalli v. First National Insurance Co.,347 the court used the concept of
nalyeeh as an aid in reading an insurance contract to find, against the
arguments of the non-Indian insurance company, that the driver of a car
insured in an accident with an uninsured motorist was entitled to stack the
uninsured motorist coverage provided in the policies of each of the cars of the
insured in order to receive full compensation for her injuries. In Jensen v.
Giant Industries, Arizona, Inc.,348 the court reversed a grant of summary
judgment in favor of a non-Indian gas station chain that was sued after the
plaintiff was injured by a third party in the parking lot of one of its stations.
While Giant had argued successfully below that nalyeeh prohibited recovery
from third parties, the court held that a single affidavit by a medicine man was
not enough to establish a common law prohibition on such recovery.349 The
court remanded for more evidence.
And in the controversial case of Nez v. Peabody Western Coal Co.,
Inc.,350 the court reversed a grant of summary judgment against a Navajo who
sued a non-Indian company in tort after accepting worker’s compensation for
his injuries. Federal law provides that state worker compensation schemes
apply to individuals working for private companies on federal lands,351 and
has been interpreted to apply to private employers in Indian country as well.352
But while the Navajo Supreme Court agreed that this application of state law
was authorized, the court held that, just as the worker’s compensation
remedies of one state did not automatically deprive another state of
jurisdiction over a common law tort based on the claims,353 it did not deprive
346

Singer v. Nez, No. SC-CV-04-99 (Navajo 07/16/2001).
7 Nav. R. 329 (S.Ct. 1998).
348
No. SC-CV-51-99 (Navajo 01/22/2002).
349
In Jensen, the district court had granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor in part
because the plaintiff had not presented evidence to rebut the evidence of the medicine man.
Id. The court found that to accept such evidence as binding on the court, particularly without
the court satisfying itself as to the expertise of the affiant, would contravene the proper role of
evidence regarding Navajo common law as a guide rather than an adversarial tool which must
be rebutted. Id.
350
7 Nav. R. 416 (S.Ct. 1999).
351
40 U.S.C. § 290.
352
See Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that § 290 allows
state workers' compensation laws to apply to employees of private employers on Indian
reservations).
353
Nez v. Western Peabody Coal at 419 citing Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955))
(holding that full faith and credit clause does not compel one state to enforce the exclusive
remedy provision of another state's workers' compensation law) and Garcia v. American
Airlines, Inc., 12 F.3d 308 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the forum state had jurisdiction over
347
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the Navajo Nation of jurisdiction over claims for remedies that were
“substantially different” than the worker’s compensation.354 Although the
court vacated the dismissal and remanded to the lower court, it held that the
Navajo law would bar the action if the plaintiff had waived the right to seek
further recovery, the action was barred by collateral estoppel, or the action
would unduly prejudice the defendant.355 The court also left open for the
district court the question whether Navajo common law itself barred plaintiffs
from seeking damages twice for the same injuries.356
While the decision created significant concern regarding potential
impact on reservation employers,357 when the issue subsequently came before
the court, it held that nalyeeh did not permit additional recovery.358 In Benally
v. Big A Well Service Co.,359 the first such case, the court emphasized that
nalyeeh had
A deeper meaning of a demand to "make right" for an injury
and an invitation to negotiate what it will take so that an
injured party will have "no hard feelings." . . . In most
an employee's common law tort suit even after the employee had received benefits under
another state's workers' compensation program).
354
Id.at 420.
355
Id at 420-21.
356
Id. at 421.
357
This concern was significant enough that the Navajo Nation Council, four months after the
decision, enacted the following resolution:
1. The Navajo Nation Insurance Services Program Workers Compensation
Program is directed to begin development of a comprehensive workers
compensation statute to cover all employers operating within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.
2. Until such time as the Navajo Nation develops a comprehensive workers
compensation law covering all employers within the jurisdiction of the
Navajo Nation, the Navajo Nation Council recognizes existing workers
compensation coverage, whether under a state statutory scheme or under
Navajo statutory law to be the exclusive remedy for covered injuries to
employees occurring in the work place.
The court rejected this apparent restriction on its institutional authority, holding that given the
presumption against ex post facto deprivations of remedies in existing cases and as the
resolution did not take the prescribed form legislative enactments, the resolution should be
interpreted as a statement of policy rather than a rule to be applied to pending cases. In re
Certified Question from the U.S. District Court for the Dist. of Arizona, No. SC-CV-49-2000
(Navajo 07/18/2001); see Benally v. Big A Well Service Co., No. SC-CV-27-99 (Nav.
8/28/2000).
358
Benally v. Broken Hill Property Ltd., No. SC-CV-79-98 (Navajo 09/21/2001); Benally v.
Big A Well Service, Co., No. SC-CV-27-99 (Navajo 08/28/2000).
359
No. SC-CV-27-99 (Nav. 8/28/2000).
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instances where an employee receives a workers' compensation
award, the nalyeeh principle should be satisfied, because there
is a method of determining the nature of the injury and the
monetary needs of the worker. . . . [S]uch benefits may not be
the same as an award in a personal injury action, but at the
same time, workers have a prompt remedy, they do not have to
face the defenses of contributory or fellow worker negligence,
and costs in terms of money and time are minimal.360
In a subsequent case, the court elaborated on this reasoning, declaring that
while nalyeeh was similar to Anglo-American concepts of compensation,
Nalyeeh has an additional procedural aspect which addresses
relationships. Nalyeeh does not simply require restitution or
reparation, but calls upon the person who has caused an injury
or is responsible for an injury to talk out both compensation
and relationships. . . . It is not simply a legal equitable doctrine
to be applied by a court as an impartial decision-maker, but a
relationship value. . . . In the case before us, the district court
chose to ignore the parties' contentions on the cause of the
death and the amount of damages which resulted using a
commonsense doctrine that it would be unfair for the
appellants to choose one remedy, receive its benefits, and then
seek another. . .
We have said that Navajo common law requires people
to keep their word and honor their promises. . . . In this
particular situation, the appellants' decedent went to work at a
coal mine understanding that if he was injured, the mining
company would pay for the injury under a workers'
compensation program. The appellants sought and received
death benefits under that program, and the company kept its
word by paying them, as agreed. The wrongful death suit
attempted to reject the agreement the parties reached and thus
broke it. Accordingly, the district court was correct in
dismissing the wrongful death suit on equitable principles as a
matter of Navajo common law.361

360
361

Id.
Benally v. Broken Hill Property Ltd., No. SC-CV-79-98 (Navajo 09/21/2001).
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Thus, Navajo common law, far from a trap for the unwary in tribal courts,
became a tool to ensure comparable protections to those in state courts even in
situations where tribal codes had not yet provided protection. But by finding
these guarantees in Navajo traditions, they become part of the general code of
conduct appropriate for the Navajo people rather than foreign restrictions on
action imposed because of a need to model non-Indian courts.
2. Cases Arising from Business Relationships
The cases involving outsiders largely arise from business relationships,
the most common situation in which non-Indians find themselves in Navajo
courts. Sixty out of the 109 cases involving non-Navajos, or approximately
55% of the total cases, arise from employment, contract, and worker’s
compensation disputes alone. In most of these cases, non-Indians appear as
powerful institutions, as employers, sellers, or lenders, while Navajos
typically appear in their individual status. The Navajo Nation has a
significant interest in protecting its members from predatory practices by such
institutions, and indeed has passed several laws, including a law prohibiting
self-help repossession without judicial approval362 and the Navajo Preference
in Employment Act,363 which prohibits termination of employees without just
cause, in order to protect Navajo individuals in their business relationships.
One might fear that this concern would result in bias against such institutions
when they appear in court. At least one litigant, the Atkinson Trading
Company, current owner of the Cameron Trading Post, sought
(unsuccessfully) to avoid exhausting a claim in tribal court by arguing that the
court was biased against it.364
Review of the decisions regarding such cases reveals that the court is
balanced in hearing cases against non-Indian businesses. As reflected in the
chart below, after subtracting cases in which non-Navajos were on both sides
and there was no clear winner, non-Indian businesses won 29 of the cases and
lost 23. If the numbers are adjusted to reflect the two cases in which Hopi
employees were involved in disputes with non-Indian businesses, both of
which the Hopi litigants won, non-Indian businesses lost 25 of the cases.
Table II: Disputes Arising from Commercial Relationships with Non-Indians
Non-Navajo Non-Navajo Non-Navajos
Results mixed Total
Won
Lost
on both sides
or no win or
362

7 N.N.C. § 607.
15 N.N.C. §§ 601-619.
364
See Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000).
363
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Even the Atkinson Trading Company seems to have gotten a fair
shake. While the court has twice rejected claims that it has no inherent
jurisdiction over the company,367 in the one case deciding on the merits of a
case it reversed an employment decision in favor of a Navajo employee,
holding that the lower court was improper in requiring the defendant to prove
just cause for termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” 368
Comparison of the likely results in state and federal courts provides
further evidence that non-Indian businesses are not overly disadvantaged in
the Navajo courts. Several of the cases regarding contracts for consumer
goods involve either federal or state consumer protection laws.369 These
365

The numbers before the slash include only cases in which the employee was Navajo; the
numbers after the slash include both those where the employee was Navajo and the employee
was Hopi.
366
The numbers before the slash include cases in which a Hopi was on one side and a
business was on the other.
367
Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000) and In Re
Atkinson Trading Co., 7 Nav. R. 275 (S.Ct. 1997).
368
Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000).
369
In interpreting federal statutes, the court takes a stance similar to that of state or federal
court. It accepts decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding federal laws as binding, but
accepts lower court decisions only as guidance, and considers itself to have the same power to
interpret such laws as would a state or federal court. See Manygoats v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 4 Nav. R. 94 (1983). With respect to state law, the court relies state courts
to determine the proper interpretation of state statutes, but in the absence of such
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cases provide an opportunity to examine what other courts did with similar
claims. In Smoak v. Chevrolet,370 for example, the court considered whether
provisions for acceleration of installment payments were “charges” that
needed to be disclosed on the face of contracts for consumer goods under the
Truth in Lending Act.371 The court held that while an acceleration clause that
simply accelerated the rate of payment need not be disclosed, one that
provided the seller with an unearned benefit by allowing the seller to keep
unearned interest or other finance charges was the equivalent of a charge, and
therefore required disclosure.372 In so holding, the court declined to follow
decisions by the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits that such provisions need not
be disclosed.
While at first glance this result might seem to suggest a less favorable
climate for non-Indian businessmen, further examination counters this
suggestion. First, the court noted that the Third Circuit relied on a state statute
providing that unearned finance charges and interest could never be retained
in the face of acceleration, and agreed that where state law required such
rebates, there was no charge that needed to be disclosed.373 Second, the Fifth
Circuit subsequently met en banc to reverse its prior decision, reaching
essentially the same decision as the Navajo court.374 The Ninth Circuit
subsequently reached a more radical position than the Navajo Court, (one
previously adopted by several district courts) holding that acceleration clauses
must always be disclosed to inform the consumer of their effect on unearned
finance charges.375 Finally, the Federal Reserve Board, the agency charged
with administering the Truth in Lending Act, itself interpreted the Act as the
Navajo Nation had, an interpretation implicitly adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court when it overruled the Ninth Circuit.376 Thus the Navajo Nation, rather
than adopting an unusually pro-consumer stance, instead struck a middle
ground ultimately consistent with the holdings of the majority of circuits as
well as the administering agency.
interpretations makes its own attempt to determine the intent of the legislature. See General
Electric Credit Corp. v. Becenti,
4 Nav. R. 34, 34-36 (Ct.App. 1983).
370
1 Nav. R. 153 (1977).
371
15 U.S.C. §§ 1638-1639.
372
1 Nav. R. at 159.
373
Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1975).
374
McDaniel v. Fulton National Bank of Atlanta, 571 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(acceleration clause alone not charge but provision permitting retention of unearned interest
charge requiring disclosure).
375
St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977).
376
Ford Motor Company v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 563 n.8 (1980) (discussing
administrative interpretations).
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In other cases, the Navajo courts reached positions more favorable to
businesses than those of surrounding courts. The court held, for example,
that counterclaims under the Truth in Lending Act were barred by the Act’s
one year statute of limitations,377 although a slight majority of state courts,
including the New Mexico Supreme Court, had reached the opposite
conclusion.378 In 1980, Congress amended the statute to permit such
counterclaims after the expiration of the statute of limitations; only then did
the Navajo court reverse its prior position.379
And while very few of the businesses that find themselves before the
court are run by Navajos, the court appears very aware that an anti-business
climate will not serve the Navajo people. In one employment case, for
example, the court rejected an interpretation of the Navajo Preference in
Employment Act that would require companies to grant preference to
“potentially qualified” applicants, and thereby require the employer to delay
hiring until potentially qualified Navajo applicants had been given a
mandatory welding test.380 The court found that such a requirement would
discourage businesses from locating on the Navajo Nation, reduce
employment opportunities, and thereby defeat the ultimate intent of the law.381
In another case, the court upheld the Navajo Nation’s claim of sovereign
immunity, but encouraged the Navajo Nation Council to waive sovereign
immunity in its contracts to encourage economic development on the Navajo
Nation.382 In developing its judicial system, the Navajo Nation seeks both to
protect Navajo individuals and to encourage non-Indian business to invest and
participate in economic development. The court appears to be aware that the
best way to accomplish both goals is to provide a forum that merits the trust of
all parties.
3. Child Custody Cases
Another area in which one might fear bias is in cases involving child
custody. The Navajo Nation, like many Indian nations, sees maintaining a
connection with Navajo children as necessary to safeguard its future. The
Navajo Nation court has declared that “[t]he most precious resource of the
377

Smoak v. Chevrolet, 1 Nav. R. 153, 160-61(1977).
A-1 Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Becenti, 2 Nav. R. 72, 75 (C.P. Dist. Ct. 1979) (collecting
cases).
379
Manygoats v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 4 Nav. R. 94, 97 (1983) (discussing P.L.
96-221, Title VI, Sec. 615, 94 Stat. 180).
380
Largo v. Gregory & Cook, Inc., 7 Nav. R. 111 (S.Ct. 1995).
381
Id. at 114-15.
382
TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 7 Nav. R. 57 (S.Ct. 1988).
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Navajo Nation is indeed its children,” and interprets the Navajo Nation
Children's Code as designed “to protect this vital resource of the Navajo
Nation.”383 It would not be surprising if this concern resulted in a bias against
non-Navajo parents when they seek custody of children born in relationships
with Navajos, or in favor of the jurisdiction of Navajo courts over custody
determinations.
The federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 384 provides the Navajo
courts with broad, controversial jurisdiction over these custody disputes.
Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address the startling and disproportionate
rates at which Indian children were being removed from their homes and
placed with non-Indian families. One of the central means through which the
Act tried to curb this trend was to increase tribal court jurisdiction over
custody decisions385 involving Indian children.386 The Act provides tribes
with exclusive jurisdiction over such cases where the children are domiciled
on reservations or are wards of the tribal court, and presumptive jurisdiction
where the children are domiciled off reservation.387 Concern that tribal courts
given jurisdiction will favor tribal retention of Indian children over the
children’s best interests or the rights of the parent involved appears to
motivate much ICWA litigation in state courts.
The Navajo Nation has one of the most active Indian Child Welfare
offices in the country and in the 1980s obtained a landmark decision from the
Utah Supreme Court affirming its jurisdiction over a Navajo child that had
never lived on the reservation and had been placed since birth with a nonIndian adoptive family.388 Its aggressive enforcement of the Act surely brings
children with connections to non-Indian guardians and relatives into the
Navajo courts. Despite this, not one of the 513 Navajo appellate cases on line
383

In re A.O., No. 4 Nav. R. 121 (Sh.R.Dist.Ct. 1987); see also In re Custody of S.R.T., 6
Nav. R. 407, 411 (S.Ct. 1991) (“There is no resource more vital to the continued existence
and integrity of the Navajo Nation than our children. Consequently, we have a special duty to
ensure their protection and well-being.”)
384
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1931.
385
The definition of child custody cases excludes both those arising from disputes between
parents and those arising from criminal acts by minors. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
386
An “Indian child” is one that is either an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe,
or the biological child of an enrolled member and eligible for enrollment in the tribe. 25
U.S.C. § 1903(4).
387
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) and (b). Under Section 1911(b), even where a case arises in state
court, the court must notify the relevant tribe, and, upon a request by the tribe or the child’s
parent or guardian, must transfer the case to tribal court absence an objection by one of the
child’s parents or “good cause” to the contrary.
388
In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986). The U.S. Supreme Court quoted
extensively from the Holloway case in reaching the same holding. Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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arises under ICWA.389 This alone suggests that when the Navajo Nation
courts exercise jurisdiction in custody cases involving nonmembers, parties
tend to be satisfied with the results.
Additional evidence comes from the custody cases the court has
decided. Custody disputes arising between parents are not governed by
ICWA, and the Navajo courts have decided several of these. Of the six online appellate decisions involving custody of children of both Navajo and nonNavajo parents, non-Navajos won four. The earliest of these is In re
Chewiwi,390 a 1977 case concerning custody of the daughter of an Isleta
Pueblo man and a Navajo woman.391 During their marriage, the couple lived
on the Isleta Pueblo, and enrolled their daughter, Catherine Chewiwi, with the
Pueblo.392 When Catherine was five, both her parents were killed in an auto
accident and the Isleta Pueblo court appointed her paternal uncle as her
guardian.393 A few months later, while Catherine was visiting her Navajo
maternal relatives on the Navajo Nation, they filed a petition for guardianship
with the Navajo courts. The trial court granted them temporary guardianship,
and the Chewiwis appealed.394
The Navajo Court of Appeals vacated the order. The court held that
although it had jurisdiction over any Navajo child properly on the reservation,
and the child was on the reservation with the consent of her legal guardian,
“[t]he mere fact that the child visited relatives within the Navajo Nation
cannot by itself confer on a Navajo court the subject matter jurisdiction to
determine this child's status.”395 As to the Isleta Pueblo order, the court held
that although the Navajo Nation was not a party to the U.S. Constitution, and
therefore not bound to grant full faith and credit to foreign orders, the order
would be recognized as a matter of comity.396
Subsequent decisions also recognize the rights of non-Navajo relatives
in child custody disputes. In 1982 in Lente v. Notah,397 the court vacated a
district court order granting a Navajo father custody of his child with a
Comanche woman. Although the parents had agreed to a divorce decree
389

Four cases, including three district court cases, mention the Act, but only to use its findings
as guidance or to say that the cases are not brought under the Act. While none of the district
court cases on line arise under the Act either, given the limited publishing of district court
decisions one should not draw significant conclusions from this statistic.
390
1 Nav. R. 120 (1977).
391
Id. at 120.
392
Id. at 124.
393
Id. at 120-21.
394
Id. at 121.
395
Id. at 124.
396
Id. at 126-26.
397
3 Nav. R. 72 (1982)
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stipulating that Ms. Lente would have custody, two years later Mr. Notah filed
for custody claiming that she had given him the child saying she did not want
her anymore.398 The trial court granted temporary custody without granting
the mother proper notice, an order the court found denied her “basic rights
guaranteed by the Navajo Bill of Rights and common sense.” 399Although
Ms. Lente had later been given notice and participated in the hearings leading
to the final custody order, she had preserved her right to object to jurisdiction
and the appellate court held that the subsequent hearings were not enough to
cure the initial improper order. 400Although the appellate court vacated the
order, it held that because the child likely formed psychological bonds with
her father in the four years she had lived with him, she should not be removed
pending rehearing. The court ordered that upon rehearing the lower court
should obtain expert evaluations of the best interests of the child, and listed
thirty-four factors it should consider in making its decision.401 While the
mother argued that the Navajo custom of matrilocality should determine the
case in her favor, the court held that this was a decision for the trial court,
which had the power to determine whether it was appropriate to follow
common law under the circumstances.402 (In a subsequent custody dispute
between Navajo parents, the court held that following the common law
presumption of custody in favor of the mother would violate the Navajo Equal
Rights Amendment.403)
The next case, Yazzie v. Yazzie404 concerned an action filed by a
Navajo father for divorce of his Comanche wife and custody of his four
children. At the time of the filing, his wife and their children had not resided
on the reservation for some time.405 After initially filing a motion challenging
jurisdiction, the mother did not further participate in the proceedings.406 The
judge, therefore, granted the divorce and decided as to the division of property
and custody of the children by default.407 The appellate court reversed. It
held that while the trial court had jurisdiction over the marriage as the father
resided on the Navajo Nation, it did not have custody over the children or
398

Id. at 72.
Id. at 75.
400
Id. at 74.
401
Id. at 78-79.
402
Id. at 79-80. In Matter of Chewiwi the court had recognized an order placing a child with
her non-Navajo paternal relatives, an order that would go against this customary tradition.
Common law, however, does not appear to have been raised in the case.
403
Help v. Silvers, 4 Nav. R. 66 (S.Ct. 1985).
404
5 Nav. R. 66 (S.Ct. 1985).
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Id. at 67.
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property off the reservation.408 While affirming the divorce, therefore, the
court vacated the remainder of the order for lack of jurisdiction.
The court has also made substantive custody determinations that
favored non-Navajo parents. In Pavenyouma v. Goldtooth,409 the lower court
found both the Hopi mother and Navajo father to be suitable parents,410 but
after the parents could not agree on a plan for joint custody of their five
children ordered that the mother would have custody of two of the children
and the father would have custody of the other three. The appeals court
reversed, finding that while it was preferable for parents to agree on
arrangements for joint custody, it was the obligation of the court to step in if
they could not.411 The court ordered that the mother would have custody of
all children during the school year, while the father would have custody
during the summer, and ordered the father to pay child support while the
children were with their mother.412
The one troubling case is In re Custody of S.R.T.,413 in which the court
upheld a default order granting a Navajo mother custody over her child
against the claims of a non-Indian that claimed to be the father. Although the
child was an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, he was living in Texas
with the sister of the non-Indian alleged father at the time the petition for
custody was filed.414 The non-Indian father had received notice of the petition
and had retained local counsel before the hearing.415 Neither the father nor his
attorney, however, showed up for the hearing. The attorney had mailed a
motion for continuance to the court on the day before the hearing, and it was
not received until the day after the hearing.416 The appellate court found that
the father had proper notice of the hearing and no excuse for failing to
appear.417
The Navajo Supreme Court did, however, examine the limited
evidence of paternity presented on appeal. The mother’s name alone was on
the birth certificate and the child had the mother’s name, and the couple had
only lived together briefly before the appellant began living with another
woman.418 The only written evidence of any family relation with the
408

Id. at 70-71.
4 Nav. R. 17 (Ct.App. 1984).
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appellant was a letter authorizing his sister to consent to medical care for the
child, and the court found this was not enough to establish paternity.419 As to
jurisdiction, the court found that as the child was born out of wedlock,
because the father had made no efforts to establish paternity his domicile for
jurisdictional purposes was the same as that of the natural mother.420 While
the jurisdictional decision seems unfair to the off-reservation father, the
principle that domicile of an illegitimate child was that of the child’s mother
regardless of whether the child had ever been present in the jurisdiction
derives from Anglo-American law.421
While the appellate court has decided one additional case, In re
A.O.,422 in a way unfavorable to a non-Navajo parent, this was an intermediate
decision. In the case, the court reversed a lower court’s dismissal of a petition
for custody and remanded for more facts as to jurisdiction.423 On remand the
district court affirmed the denial of jurisdiction.424 The child had been made
the ward of the court based on a petition alleging abuse, a fact that would
ordinarily grant the court jurisdiction. The district court found, however, that
the order of wardship was based on a fraud on the court, as the petitioners had
not notified the court of the pending New Mexico court case.425 Under these
facts, the court ceded to the concurrent jurisdiction of the New Mexico
courts.426 Two other district court cases involving non-Navajo parents are also
on-line, and both reveal the same reluctance to accept questionable
jurisdiction.427
419
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Id. at 409-411.
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The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this as a principle of federal common law in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) holding that illegitimate children
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also Matter of Appeal in Pima County Superior Court Action No-S903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz.
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In re Custody of B.N.P., 4 Nav. R. 155 (1983), for example, involved a custody dispute
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decree in Mescalero Apache court, and originally stipulated to custody in the father. Two
years later, however, while the children were on the Mescalero Apache reservation visiting
their mother, the mother returned to the Mescalero court and, under the pretext of the presence
of the children, had the decree modified. Some months later, when the children were visiting
the father, he went to the Navajo Nation court for custody using the same pretext. The court
recognized the delicacy of the dispute, stating that “this court is called upon to make a
decision on which of the two Indian governments should exercise the power and duty to
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In sum, therefore, even in the vital issue of custody of children with
Navajo heritage, the court appears to have been equitable to non-Navajo
parents, and not to have asserted a broad jurisdiction that would deprive
parents of their rights.
e. Conclusion
The data regarding the experience of nonmembers in the Navajo courts
do not support the assumption of the United States Supreme Court that
nonmembers will be at a disadvantage in tribal courts. Nonmembers win half
of the time they appear before the courts, and the decisions reveal few
troubling assessments of law or fact. This is true even in cases involving
matters that would seem particularly vulnerable to bias. More work needs to
be done regarding nonmembers in other tribal court systems. But given the
disproportionate size and population of the Navajo Nation and the fact that
more than most tribal courts it has the characteristics particularly troubling to
the U.S. Supreme Court, data regarding the Navajo courts are of particular
relevance.
The relative fairness of the courts, however, does not speak to the
second assumption of the Supreme Court, that adjudication of outsider rights
has little to do with “self-government,” or the legal and governmental integrity
of tribes. The following sections of the Article will discuss the particular
historical position of tribal legal justice systems, additional statistics regarding
nonmembers in the Navajo courts, and theoretical insights regarding the role
of formal legal institutions to challenge this assumption.
III. Origins of Tribal Courts and the Struggle for Legitimacy

interests of the children who come before it, and after that considerations of governmental
relations come into play.” It declared that it was uncomfortable with the parental kidnapping
on both sides, but declined to recognize the modified Mescalero Apache decree as jurisdiction
was fraudulently obtained. Deciding the case on the merits, the court held that because the
children had always lived on the Navajo Nation, and said they were afraid to live with the
mother because of her drinking, the court ordered custody in the father with reasonable
visitation in the mother. In In re Adoption of S.C.M., 4 Nav. R. 167 (1983), the court denied a
Navajo uncle of a Canadian Indian child the right to an adoption and temporary custody order.
Although the parents had signed consent to adoption in Canada, it was not clear why the
adoption had not been pursued in Canadian court, or that the Navajo Nation courts even had
jurisdiction over the child under the applicable rules of domicile and personal jurisdiction.
Nor could the uncle have the investigation for adoption waived, although a Canadian report
appeared to be attached to the affidavits of consent. Instead, the uncle was required to prove
that the Navajo Nation court, and not the Canadian courts, was the appropriate forum.

71

Tribal courts in the United States have an ambiguous meaning in
Indian communities. They have been both tools of acculturation, intended to
undo indigenous culture and contribute to assimilation of Indian people, and
tools of resistance to the colonial project, means of asserting sovereignty,
warding off foreign interference, and finding uniquely tribal ways of dealing
with the clash between tribal and non-tribal cultures. The history of the
Navajo Nation court system repeats these themes of colonialism and
resistance. This distinctive history shapes the present struggle to develop
legitimate and functioning legal systems, and the role of outsiders within this
struggle.
a.

Tribal Courts as Tools of Acculturation

The current denigration of tribal justice systems is not new. Federal
policy makers have long portrayed Indian people as without meaningful
law,428 even when there was ample evidence to the contrary. Thus in 1834,
Congress declared that the Indian country beyond the Mississippi was
characterized by a “want of fixed laws, of competent tribunals of justice,”429
despite the fact that the southeastern tribes it had settled there had police,
constitutions, written codes, and trial and appellate courts as sophisticated as
many territorial courts.430 Similarly, in 1883 the Supreme Court described
Brûlé Sioux methods of dealing with murderers as “red man’s revenge,”431
although federal officials knew that the tribe had already resolved the matter
through Sioux justice methods of mediation and symbolic compensation,432 a
mode of punishment at least as civilized as the hanging in vogue in non-Indian
courts of the time.
This constructed absence of law served federal purposes well. For a
country whose most important legal decision proudly declares that “[t]he
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government
of laws, and not of men,”433 to be without law was automatically to be
inferior. In addition, it was easier for the federal government to continue to
428
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believe itself worthy of the “high appellation” of a government of laws434 if it
could pretend that it was not breaking the laws of another people in taking
their property and sovereignty. The perceived absence of law thus created a
vacuum that justified the extension of federal power.435
These policy makers were also well aware of the ways that law
transforms consciousness. They saw acceptance of Anglo law as both
necessary and instrumental to acceptance of Anglo civilization. In 1832, the
first Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Elbert Herring, declared that, “the
absence of meum and tuum in the general community of possessions, which is
the grand conservative principle of the social state, is a perpetual cause of the
vis inertiae of savage life.”436 By the 1850s, when the Indian Department was
formulating its policy of forcible assimilation, it was advocating for
imposition of legal systems on tribes.437 Treaties of the time allowed the
President to prescribe systems of law for the Indians, and administrators
advocated for dictation of civil as well as criminal laws as a necessary step in
the assimilationist project.438
In the 1860s, federal agents on Indian reservations began to
experiment with using Indian people as tools for imposition of legal order on
reservations. They appointed Indians as police officers, and set themselves or
trusted Indians as judges. While federal officials quite early began to place
Indians in positions of power in reservation legal systems, they did not do so
to empower tribal people. By appointing tribal members as judges and police,
federal agents not only saved money and gained staff, they made tribal people
434
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agents of their own acculturation. These tribal members were more effective
in enforcing the will of the colonizers than the government itself could ever
be. Seduced by the hope of gaining power and prestige in a federal system
intent on depriving them of traditional sources of pride, Indian people were
wonderfully efficient at policing, hunting, and capturing their own.439 But the
Indian Department was not satisfied with even this level of tribal involvement
in Indian control, and sought the extension of all federal laws over Indians.440
Congress would not accede to this violation of tribal sovereignty, and instead
simply authorized funding for tribal police in 1878.441
The first federally sanctioned tribal courts did not have even this
minimal congressional support. Rather, they were the result of direction by
H.M. Teller, the newly appointed Secretary of the Interior, to create
institutions to help put an end to a variety of practices he saw as obstacles to
tribal assimilation: religious dances, polygamy, use of medicine men, and the
custom of abandoning and destroying the homes of the dead.442 By April 10,
1883, a few months after this order, Commissioner Hiram Price had
promulgated regulations establishing of Courts of Indian Offenses443 along
with a code forbidding each of these expressions of indigenous culture.444 In
1888, the District Court of Oregon called these courts “mere educational and
disciplinary instrumentalities, by which the government of the United States is
endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition of these dependent tribes to
whom it sustains the relation of guardian.”445
While the district court stated that the courts were a “laudable effort . .
. to educate these Indians in the habit and knowledge of self-government,” 446
policy makers in the East hoped that they would destroy tribal governments.
One Commissioner of Indian Affairs declared that the tribal police force was
“a power entirely independent of the chiefs. It weakens, and will finally
destroy, the power of tribes and bands.”447 Indian police and courts were used
to round up children for boarding schools, to sanction tribal members that did
439
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not carry out BIA work assignments, and capture those that rebelled against
federal policies.
Nor were there any guarantees of neutrality in the justice dispensed.
While one of the contemporary complaints is that tribal courts are not
independent from tribal political branches,448 it appears that the blurring of
judicial and political roles is an inheritance from this early period of federal
domination. The federal superintendent or agent typically appointed the
Indian judges, sometimes acted as prosecutor, and all of the decrees of the
court were subject to his approval. At many agencies, congressional failure to
appropriate any funding for judges’ salaries until 1888, or adequate funding
thereafter, necessitated that tribal police double as judges, arresting a suspect,
bringing him in, and then changing hats and sentencing him.449 In 1891, the
Board of Indian Commissioners declared that the courts were “more in the
nature of courts martial than civil courts, and practically register the decrees
of the Indian agent.”450
While by 1900 two thirds of Indian agencies had Courts of Indian
Offenses,451 this was the height of their existence, and by 1928 there were
only 30 remaining.452 As part of the Indian New Deal of the 1930s, federal
officials worked with tribes to create “tribal courts” with the freedom to draw
up their own codes.453 Indian Services officers were prohibited from
“controlling, obstructing, or interfering with the function of Indian Courts,”
and tribal approval was needed for appointment or removal of judges.454 By
1978, when Oliphant was decided, out of 133 tribal courts, only 33 were
Courts of Indian Offenses.455 But despite the name changes, the new tribal
courts were still creatures of federal influence,456 and the heritage of western
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style courts as tools of the federal agents directed at assimilation still colors
the perception and the reality of these courts on many reservations.457
b.

Tribal Courts as Tools of Resistance

But there is an alternative history to tribal courts. In this history, tribal
courts are tools of resistance, ways both to ward off outside interference with
tribal affairs and win the right to achieve tribal solutions to modern problems.
Even where the institutions were designed by outside forces hostile to tribes,
tribal people often found ways to subvert these purposes and validate their
culture in the foreign forms. By doing so in institutions recognizable by nonIndians, moreover, they created a space and means for resistance.
The first western style tribal courts were those created by the Cherokee
Nation in 1820.458 The courts and the code they enforced may be criticized as
voluntary assimilation, an example of more assimilated members of the
community hijacking the Cherokee government and forcing it to turn from
traditional law ways.459 But as Rennard Strickland has shown, Cherokee
adoption of a centralized legal authority and many of the laws subsequently
adopted were not an accession to federal efforts at assimilation, but instead a
response to the need for unity in the face of attempts to take Cherokee land.460
457
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While not all laws had this land-preserving justification, the early
history of the Cherokees’ western legal system shows that it often
supplemented rather than displaced Cherokee law ways. The parties before
the court were largely relative outsiders—assimilated mixed blood Cherokees,
intermarried whites, and blacks461--and the disputes before it were largely
those involving new problems that Cherokee customary law did not
address.462 At the same time, traditional Cherokee law ways often continued
to govern the situations for which they were designed. In other cases the new
Cherokee laws were designed to protect Cherokee people from the opposing
legal customs of outsiders. One of the earliest laws, reenacted several times,
provided that a white man could not, by marriage, gain the right to dispose of
a Cherokee woman’s property without her consent, 463 a law that both
protected Cherokee land from white usurpation and preserved traditional
marital property laws. 464
The western structure also created a space in which traditional law
ways could be expressed. The unassimilated Cherokee-speaking majority
tended to elect judges like themselves who were able to resolve disputes
according to more traditional norms.465 Jurors as well tended to represent the
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traditional majority. 466 Trials were thus conducted in part in Cherokee,467 and
might incorporate tradition in other ways invisible to non-Indians.468
None of this is to say that the resulting legal system always met this
goal of addressing the new conflicts posed by this clash of cultures,469 or that
some of the Cherokees crafting it did not intend for the laws to help displace
the more traditional Cherokee culture.470 But it is clear that the adoption of a
western legal system was much an effort at resistance and survival under
changed circumstances as is was one of assimilation, and that while styled in a
western mold, it came to reflect traditional practices as well.
Even the federally imposed Indian police and Courts of Indian
Offenses created space for resistance. The Indian police were often willing
participants in their own colonization, helping federal officials complete tasks
inimical to tribal identity. But they also at times resisted such tasks. The
Shoshone and Bannock police force, for example, resigned en masse rather
than round up school children or arrest the parents that failed to send them.471
The Ute police chief was fired after he led the opposition to the boarding
schools.472 The Jicarilla Apache police force also resigned rather than be
forced to capture renegade members of another Apache clan.473
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In addition, while Eastern policy makers envisioned the Indian police
as furthering the assimilationist goals of the administration, in practice much
of their time was spent controlling non-Indians that preyed on the tribes.474
While it had been a federal crime to trespass on Indian lands or property since
1790,475 federal officials had never had the will to effectively enforce these
laws.476 The Indian police forces had no such compunctions. The Kiowa and
Comanche police spent their days riding the Texas range noting the brands of
cattle that white ranchers let graze without permission so that fines could be
charged against their owners.477 Policemen also enforced prohibitions against
poaching on Indian lands, in one instance confiscating 114 quail stolen for
export to New Zealand,478 and seizing and destroying shipments by liquor
smugglers.479
The Indian police and courts also replaced more coercive efforts at
federal domination. Agents originally turned to Indian police to decrease the
influence of the U.S. military,480 and were able to use their existence to justify
removal of troops from Indian agencies.481 While federal statements as to the
wishes of Indian people are often more reflective of federal rather than Indian
desires, commonsense gives credence to federal reports that Indians were not
eager to be supervised by federal troops.482 Indian police and courts were also
authorized in a time of intense pressure by the Indian Department to extend
full federal jurisdiction over Indian people.483 The Indian institutions, while
also coercive, at least preserved some measure of self-government.

474

Id. at 52-53, 127.
1 Stat. 137 (1790).
476
See e.g., Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1413 (1997)
477
HAGAN, supra note 436 at 52-53.
478
Id. at 53-54.
479
Id. at 55.
480
Major Indian wars in the aftermath of the U.S. Civil War lead to a vehement and nearly
successful campaign to transfer the Indian Office back from the Department of the Interior to
the War Department. PRUCHA, supra note 454 at 482. Indian agents were thus under
pressure to show that their methods, which relied on more subtle coercion of Indian people,
were at least as successful as military force in preserving order.
481
HAGAN, supra note 436 at 30-31, 50.
482
See Annual Report of the Comm’r of Indian Affairs, H. Exec. Doc. 1 at 472, 40th Cong., 3rd
Sess. (1868), reprinted in 1366 U.S. Serial Set (Commissioner Taylor reporting that he had
consulted with leaders of many tribes in past year and “without exception, they have declared
their unwillingness to have the military among them.”).
483
Hagan, supra note 436 at 42. See also Harring at 134-36. In 1885, the Indian Department
did win a partial victory when Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act extending federal
jurisdiction over certain crimes between Indians. Harring at 134.
475

79

Nor did the courts function as the controlled educational instruments
federal policymakers envisioned. For example, although the only firm
prerequisite for judgeship was that the judge not be a polygamist, agents were
often required to waive this requirement in order to secure the services of
individuals that actually commanded the respect of their tribes. The
Comanche leader Quannah Parker, for example, began his judgeship with six
wives and married a seventh during his tenure.484 While Parker was an
advocate for adoption of Anglo concepts of property and commerce, he also
defended the use of peyote, which he himself used, and refused to support the
abolition of Indian dances.485 The record of one of his cases shows how little
Parker enforced Anglo prescriptions against polygamy and adultery. A man
had been charged with having seduced a woman away from her husband. The
husband had another wife, but she was ill. The man was found guilty, but was
not fined or sentenced.486 The woman was told to return to her husband, but
only until his other wife had recovered.487
The Kiowa and Comanche court was not the only Court of Indian
Offenses whose operation was better tailored to tribal than federal conceptions
of justice. While the courts of Indian offenses were criticized as paramilitary
tribunals of despotic agents, the 1928 Meriam Report found that they were
“more open to criticism for lenity than for severity,”488 and that when the
superintendent wished to be “particularly severe on a particular Indian, the
usual means of attaining his desire [was] to turn the individual over to the
state or United States courts for attention.”489 Proceedings before the courts
were informal, and were conducted in the language of the tribe with only a
brief record in English,490 effectively denying federal officials much control
over the proceedings. At most Courts of Indian Offenses, they found, the
“decision of the Indian judges [was] untrammeled.”491 Probably in response
to this minimal level of control, at ten agencies superintendents had
abandoned Courts of Indian Offenses and assumed the judgeship
themselves.492 Nor were decisions shaped by the federal regulations for
484
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Courts of Indian Offenses. In the courts the investigators observed, “[t]he
decision rendered . . . depends not upon code or precedent, but upon that
subtle quality of the mind called common sense and upon an understanding of
the current native ideas of property and justice.”493
In part, the necessity for these courts came from the fact that
traditional justice systems had either been destroyed by the colonial process,
or did not have the respect of the outside forces to which tribal members had
to present formal evidence of marriage, inheritance, or criminal punishment.
But while the need for such courts may have been created by outside
influence, the courts responded to this need in a way accessible to and desired
by at least some tribal people. Even as federal support for Courts of Indian
Offenses declined in the early 1900s, therefore, some tribes advocated for
their establishment. The Umatilla Tribe, for example, asked for permission to
reestablish their court, as they needed a formal system to resolve disputes but
“it is an unheard of occurrence for an Indian to prosecute another Indian in
civil courts, where they have to employ lawyers and pay cutthroat fees.”494
Others turned against the Bureau interference but independently adopted
western police and court systems, such as the Mission Indian Federation that
was active in California at the beginning of the twentieth century.495 While
these groups felt the need of a legal system that in some ways resembled the
Anglo one, they also wanted a system tailored to the needs of their
communities. The Meriam Report took a similar position, adopting the view
of one Indian commenter496 that
When an Indian offender is brought before the Court of Indian
Offenses, neither he nor his family feels under obligation to
retain an attorney or to go to any other special expense in the
matter. If on the other hand he is taken before a white man’s
court, either state or federal, he and his family, if not his
friends, will spend all they can raise in his defense, because to
them imprisonment in the white man’s institutions, even if only
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for a few months, is an extremely severe penalty, as it goes so
counter to Indian nature.497
For the Meriam Report authors, as for the Congress of the late
nineteenth century, the existence of such courts also enhanced the argument
against extension of jurisdiction by state or federal courts.498 The former, it
was agreed, were irremediably hostile to Indian interests,499 and the latter
would not be able to as “as wisely or as surely administer justice among the
Indians” as the Indian judges themselves could.500
Thus despite the overtly colonial intentions behind federal desires to
“bring law to the Indians,” the impact of the tribally administered western
styled legal systems was mixed. In part, they performed a gap filling function,
creating a forum for disputes for which traditional legal norms and procedures
were not designed. In particular, their hybrid nature allowed them to address
disputes involving those, such as whites and assimilated tribal members, who
were less tied to traditional norms. The norms and procedures used to resolve
these disputes, moreover, were not pale imitations of western concepts;
traditional tribal conceptions of justice were often incorporated, and new ones
were developed in response to changing tribal needs. By doing so in a forum
that was recognizable by outsiders, these tribal legal institutions also became a
force for asserting tribal sovereignty and warding off incursions against it.
The heritage of contemporary tribal courts is thus distinctly ambivalent, one of
both acculturation and resistance. It is this legacy that modern tribal justice
systems must grapple with in the difficult struggle for legitimacy and efficacy.
c.

The Navajo Experience

The above themes repeat in Navajo legal history. The Navajos’ first
experience with a western legal system came at the time of their most severe
domination by the United States. In 1864, after centuries of successful
resistance to Spanish, Mexican, and American forces,501 Navajo leaders
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finally accepted defeat at the hands of Kit Carson and his troops. Under siege
and threat of starvation if they did not leave their canyon strongholds, about
half of the Navajo population took the “Long Walk”502 to Fort Sumner in
Bosque Redondo, New Mexico. Heartsick at their forced separation from
Dinetah, the Navajo homelands, and dependent on the federal superintendent
for inadequate rations,503 Navajos became subjects in a failed experiment at
forced colonization. Used to living in isolated compounds far from other
family groups, they were forced to live in closely spaced houses aligned along
rectilinear streets.504 While the Navajos had long been successful farmers, at
the ill-situated Fort they were made to clear bitter mesquite brush on diseased,
alkaline soil to plant crops that failed for four successive years.505 Deprived
of most of their horses and weapons, the people were preyed upon by raiding
Comanche.506 Women aborted their children rather than see them die of
502
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hunger.507 All were convinced that having left their homeland between the
four sacred mountains, their gods had deserted them.508
It was in this atmosphere of despair that the federal government began
its first experiments to “introduce” the Navajo people to the rule of law. The
people were divided into twelve villages, each with a principal chief charged
“to carry out and enforce all laws given to him for the government of his
village, or any instructions he may receive at any time from the commanding
officer.”509 Together with his subchiefs, each chief presided over a trial level
court for arbitration of disputes and adjudication of criminal offenses.510 The
commanding officer would serve as the court of appeal, with the principal
chiefs serving as jurors.511
In part, the courts may have been a response to the breakdown of
Navajo governmental structure accompanying military defeat and
imprisonment; the officers recommended that “[i]n order to wean the Indians
from their present helpless dependence on the military power . . . in future all
complaints must be submitted to the respective chiefs and their courts for
redress and settlement, and not as heretofore to the post commander.”512 But
the offenses the military officers designed were more appropriate to a labor
camp than a court of law, and included imprisonment, lashes, or hard labor for
such “crimes” as refusing to work, destroying agricultural tools provided by
the government, destroying farm produce, absence from the reservation, and
absence from one’s assigned village between 7 p.m. and 5 a.m. in winter, or 8
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p.m. to 4 a.m. in summer.513 The drafters also made clear their disdain for
Navajo ideas of law. The proposed code, they declared,
[H]as embraced only such offenses as are particularly
applicable to these people in their present transition state. . . . It
may appear unjust to punish people for a violation of laws
which they do not only not understand, but have heretofore
been taught to regard as the highest virtue to break. But it must
be recollected that these Indians have got to be made to respect
the bonds which unite civilized society, and the only practical
way of doing this is by inflicting a punishment, however light,
for the first offence, and increasing the punishment in
proportion to the increase of knowledge, until its severity
would prevent further repetition. This is the only possible
mode of instructing them on the subject of the law.”514
After four years of imprisonment, the enormous expense of the
experiment and the reports of misery of the Navajos moved even federal
policy makers. Although federal officials had hoped to remove the Navajos to
the Indian Territory in Oklahoma, they ultimately acceded to the pleas of the
Navajo people and agreed that they could return to the Dinehtah.515 In the
Treaty of 1868, the United States solemnly promised that a portion of their
former lands would be “set apart for the use and occupation of the Navajo
Tribe of Indians.”516
Soon after their return, the agent set up a Navajo police force to
control Navajos that were leaving the reservation to raid Mexican livestock.
While the force might be seen as another instance of Navajos being tempted
by federal dollars and uniforms to turn against their own,517 the force was led
by Barboncito, Ganado Mucho, and Manuelito,518 all powerful leaders of the
Navajo people who were equally concerned with the raids, which they saw as
a violation of the promises they had made in the Treaty of 1868.519 In part,
therefore, federal support for these police forces facilitated the ability of the
513
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Navajo leadership to enforce what they saw as Navajo law. Perhaps dismayed
at the effectiveness of this police force, the administration in Washington
quickly disbanded it, although local agents intermittently found ways to
reinstate the force without official funding.
An incident at the beginning of the twentieth century poignantly
illustrates the conflict between external and internal legal constraints in the
development and practice of these legal institutions. The incident arose from
the alleged rape by a Navajo man of a young Navajo woman. The Navajo
policeman originally informed of the crime had already resolved it according
to Navajo tradition: he had the families of the victim and the offender agree on
a restitution payment of one white horse and had taken the horse to the family
of the girl.520 But the federal agent to the Navajos, Reuben Perry, insisted that
the offender be arrested and imprisoned.521 When he tried to arrest the man,
Navajos detained Perry himself, and two thousand Navajos, hearing of the
incident, gathered at a Yei-bi-chei ceremony in St. Michaels to participate in
the resistance.522 But Chee Dodge, a rising Navajo leader whose mother had
died on the Long Walk and who later served three times as chairman of the
Navajo Nation, addressed the crowd:
The President has given you a long rope so that you may graze
wherever you please. If a man has a good horse and pickets
him out he gives him a long rope in good grass and lets him
graze as far as he can; but if he has a mean horse he gives him
a short rope with his head tied close to a post so he can get but
a little feed. The President has given you a long rope. Some of
you have a very long rope . . . others . . . have a shorter rope;
but the President has a rope on every one of you, and if you do
not appreciate the good treatment you are given, if you try to
make trouble, he will pull on all the ropes and draw you
fellows all together in a tight place . . . You will lose your stock
and you will be wiped out, and you will be guarded by troops,
and everybody will laugh at you and say ‘See what a large tribe
this was and this is all that is left of them.”523
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In response to the speech, the Navajos that had seized Perry released him and
delivered the defendant themselves.524 In the incident we see the ambivalent
history of legal institutions among the Navajo people: the policeman who
uses his federally funded position to implement Navajo traditional law, the
non-Indians who reject this tradition, and the Navajos that comply with nonIndian law because of their keen awareness of the federal rope around their
necks.
A Navajo Court of Indian Offenses was created in 1892525 after a
federal report that “if conducted it would serve to teach the tribe the white
man’s manner of dealing out justice and give them an idea of law and legal
procedure.”526 The Navajo court and police quickly became associated with
alien federal practices.527 Shortly before the court was created, Black Horse,
the leader of the Rough Rock portion of the Reservation, lead a federal siege
against the agent and his Navajo police when they came to forcibly collect
Navajo children to send to boarding school.528 The Navajo police and courts
also enforced the infamous federal stock reduction programs of the 1930s.529
By taking away Navajo livestock, these federal attempts to reduce overgrazing
on the Navajo Nation tore at the deep structure of Navajo economic and
cultural life.530 The legal system also played into the factionalism of Navajo
politics, with the police and the courts occasionally serving as tools for
harassment of political opponents.531
But the Navajo courts also performed much needed law and order
functions. Because of the failure of federal officials to adequately prosecute
crimes under the Major Crimes Act, between 1957 and 1958, 12 out of 14
manslaughter cases, 12 out of 14 rape cases, 45 out of 48 cases of assault with
a deadly weapon, and 16 out of 18 burglary cases were prosecuted in the
Navajo courts.532 In addition, social change had created both problems and
segments of the population not amenable to the social control provided by the
524
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clan system.533 Young men returning from military service overseas brought
with them problems not easily dealt with by traditional ceremonies,534 and a
disdain for the informality of the Navajo courts and the lack of formal
education of their judges.535 Local communities asked that their members be
deputized to control increasing crime.536 The Navajo Tribal Council therefore
lobbied Congress for funds, and when this failed dedicated scarce tribal
resources to expanding their legal system in response to the demands of the
Navajo community.537
The shape of this expansion, however, was in part defined by external
ideas of law. In the late 1940s, termination of the distinct political status of
Indian people and tribes became the goal of federal policy. As part of this
policy Congress proposed giving states criminal and civil jurisdiction over
Indians on reservations. In 1949, members of Congress attempted to
condition passage of Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act538 upon extension of
state jurisdiction over the Navajo Nation.539 The amendment was supported
by the non-Indian attorney for the tribe, and was initially approved by the
Navajo Tribal Council.540 But fear of the prejudice of non-Indian legal actors
against Navajos541 created a grassroots opposition so strong that the tribal
533
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council asked President Truman to veto the entire aid package rather than
allow the passage of the amendment.542
Declaring himself “greatly
influenced” by the preference of the tribe to forgo the benefits of the bill
(which included 88 million dollars in aid), President Truman vetoed the bill as
[I]n conflict with one of the fundamental principles of Indian
law accepted by our Nation, namely, the principle of respect
for tribal self-determination in matters of local government.
The Congress and the executive branch have repeatedly
recognized that so long as Indian communities wished to
maintain, and were prepared to maintain, their own political
and social institutions, they should not be forced to do
otherwise.”543
The fight against extension of state jurisdiction was not over. In 1949,
Congress gave New York criminal jurisdiction over Indians within the
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state,544 citing the inadequacy of tribal legal systems.545 The House Report
attached a letter of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York
showing the anti-Indian biases behind the law:
[T]here have been numerous instances . . . of disorderly
conduct on the part of the Indians, which have been most
provoking. . . . Indians get drunk and beat their women and get
into fights. Recently a white man was severely beaten by
drunken Indians. Theoretically these petty offenses are within
the jurisdiction of so-called Indian courts but there is no
provision made for their punishment even if such Indians are
tried by said local Indian courts. It is a deplorable situation.
Something should be done to rectify this unbelievable
situation.546
The law was followed by a 1950 Act giving New York State civil jurisdiction
over causes involving Indians,547 and in 1953 by P.L. 83-280, which extended
state civil and criminal jurisdiction over the tribes in several states and gave
the remaining states the option of assuming such jurisdiction.548 The Senate
Report on P.L. 280 stated that while enforcement of law and order on
reservation had “been left largely to the Indian groups themselves,” many
“tribes are not adequately organized to perform that function” and willing
states were best positioned to fill the resulting “hiatus in law-enforcement
authority.”549
Navajo Tribal Council members of this period clearly understood that
unless they developed a legal system that satisfied outside observers, either
Arizona would take jurisdiction or the federal government would thrust it
upon the state.550 They therefore put even further resources and energy into
legal reform. Some of the reforms were intended to make the legal system
more expressive of local sentiment, such as the 1950 reform instituting local
544
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election of judges instead of appointment by the federal superintendent.551
Others, such as the adoption of state traffic laws,552 procedures for seizure of
property to enforce debt judgments,553 and the requirement that marriages
between Navajos and non-Navajos comply with state or foreign law,554 appear
more directly designed to appease the fears of outsiders.
In 1959 these efforts brought the tribe a tremendous legal victory. In
Williams v. Lee555 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Arizona
Supreme Court to hold that the state court had no jurisdiction over an action
by a non-Indian trader to collect a debt against Navajos for goods sold on the
Navajo Nation. Citing in part the fact that the the Tribe itself had “in recent
years greatly improved its legal system”556 the Court held that there could “be
no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”557 The same year,
the Secretary of the Interior approved a comprehensive Navajo judicial reform
package. The tribe dates the existence of a tribal court system independent
from the federally imposed Court of Indian Affairs from that year.
d.

Challenges for Navajo Justice

But this triumphant cap on judicial reform does not mean that the
resulting legal system is a successful one. Scholars have long realized that the
most important work of law occurs beyond the eyes of judges and police. As
Karl Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel observed in their study of the
Cheyenne legal system,
The success of any legal system depends upon its acceptance
by the people to whom it applies. Insofar as the system is an
integrated part of the web of social norms developed within a
society’s culture . . . it will be accepted as a parcel of habitconduct patterns in the social heritage of the people. . . . Lawin-action exists only because less stringent methods of control
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have failed to hold all persons in line or in harmony, on points
of moment.558
The more that law on the books or law in the courts diverges from popular
conceptions of justice, the less efficient it is in regulating human behavior.
Individuals will fail to follow the law except when directly observed or
coerced by representatives of the state. Few governments can afford the cost
of this constant surveillance, and even paid governmental representatives will
often diverge from the announced view of the law in their duties.559 Equally
important, the perceived tension between justice and the government leads to
corruption and other rent-seeking behavior detrimental to the community as a
whole.560
There is evidence that the formal legal system created by the Navajo
Tribal Council was, at least initially, not well incorporated in the hearts,
minds, or lives of the Navajo people. In 1972, a study of Navajo law reported
that
Law (bee haz’aanii) in the Navajo language is distinguished
from ‘a way of living’ in the religious sense (mahagha) or the
way that people think or plan (nahat’a). Anglo law is not,
then, a code that one addresses himself to when he decides how
to act or tells other people how to act, as it may well be for the
558
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middle class white person . . . Thus while an Anglo might say
to a child seen removing an object from a pick-up, ‘Don’t do
that Johnny. That is against the law,” a Navajo might say
“Don’t do that son. That is not how to act.”
Anglo law is best understood by Navajos as the forceful
activity of the courts, the police and others upon whom the
authority has been placed. It is descriptively the function of
these institutions. It is not the business of ordinary people.561
Distance between the law and “the business of ordinary people” is not
necessarily incompatible with a functioning legal system. The sense of the
separateness, almost sacredness, of law is a common Anglo perception of
law,562 and may even be part of what gives force to the idea of the “rule of
law.”563 But to the extent that the legal system is perceived not only as
separate from ordinary people, but also as without relevance to the rules that
govern a good life, it loses much of its efficacy.
The Navajo Nation and tribes generally must struggle with the legacy
of colonialism in trying to achieve internal legitimacy. On the one hand, their
governments and courts may be perceived as tools of the colonizers,
implementing a law that is almost by definition illegitimate. On the other
hand, seen through eyes colored by years of non-Indian education, they may
be perceived as illegitimate because they lack the formality, the resources, or
the education of non-Indian courts. Frank Pommersheim eloquently lays out
this dilemma in his book Braid of Feathers:
Identifiable segments of most tribes have at times
refused to consider tribal courts legitimate. In this regard,
many tribal courts are vilified as ‘white men’s’ creations . . . .
The courts are seen as instruments of outside forces and values
that are not traditional and therefore not legitimate.
By contrast, some segments of most tribal populations
(and local non-Indian populations) view tribal courts as
illegitimate because they fall, or appear to fall, far below
recognized state and federal standards in such matters ranging
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from the institutional separation of powers to the provision of
civil due process and enforcement of judgments.564
Two studies of the Navajo courts from the 1970s reveal internal
legitimacy problems attributable to these factors. Samuel Brakel examined
the Navajo courts in his 1978 book The Cost of Separate Justice. One of the
essential problems that Brakel found with the Navajo courts as with the two
other tribal court systems he studied was that a sense of inferiority led the
relatively uneducated tribal judges to rely heavily on legal technicalities and
on the urging of legally educated counsel. This judicial insecurity, he found,
deprived the courts both of the ability to administer justice, to hear both sides
fairly, or to express any kind of local or customary sense of justice. While
Brakel argued for the abolishment of tribal courts, Dan Vicenti and his
coauthors on the 1972 The Law of the People: Diné Bibee Haz’áanii,565
argued for their preservation and greater independence from non-tribal law.
But like Brakel the authors found that Navajo judges in their efforts to appear
just as good as non-Indian courts relied too heavily on non-Indian attorneys
and practiced a kind of rigid formality that had little to do with justice.566
The authors also presented evidence that the courts were either not
appreciated by or accessible to the Navajo population. They cited the fact that
in 1959, the Navajo courts handled 9,555 criminal cases, but only 690 civil
actions, and that a 1960s study of the work of one Navajo judge in the 1960s
reported that the judge handled 2,216 criminal cases and only 275 civil
cases.567 As individuals are generally forced into criminal court by the
choices of the government, these statistics suggested that very few Navajos
voluntarily used tribal courts as a means for the resolution of disputes,
whether, as Brakel believed, because they preferred state or federal courts, or,
as Vicenti and his co-authors suggested, because they preferred to rely on
traditional, extra-judicial systems of dispute resolution.
Contemporary statistics show a somewhat more balanced division
between civil and criminal cases in the Navajo Nation.568 There is a similar
trend in other tribal courts as tribal members begin to choose and guide their

564

POMMERSHEIM, supra note 8, at 67-68.
DAN VICENTI, LEONARD B. JIMSON, STEPHEN CONN, M.J.L. KELLOGG, THE LAW OF THE
PEOPLE: DINÉ BIBEE HAZ’ÁANII, A BICULTURAL APPROACH TO LEGAL EDUCATION FOR
NAVAJO STUDENTS (Ramah Navajo High School Press 1972) (hereinafter THE LAW OF THE
PEOPLE).
566
Id. at 184-86.
567
Id. at 158.
568
Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation, Fiscal Year 2002, Annual Report at 22 (2003).
565

94

involvement with tribal law.569 On the Navajo Nation, this may because of
tribal laws passed in recent years that address significant legal needs of
Navajo people, among them a comprehensive child support law, the Navajo
Preference in Employment Act, and the Navajo Repossession Act. In part it
may also be the result of significant efforts to incorporate traditional Navajo
law ways into formal Navajo legal institutions, both through use of common
law concepts in decision-making, and through the creation of Peacemaker
courts that are intended to replicate traditional methods of dispute
resolution.570
But the Navajo Nation, like other tribal courts, must still struggle with
its historical legacy in building its legal system. Its decisions are still shaped
by the very real fear that should it fail to conform to outsider ideas of law,
non-Indian actors will diminish its power,571 and the knowledge that some
tribal members will perceive the court as illegitimate for these reasons as well.
On the other hand, the court is also aware that to the extent it is perceived as
only a pale shadow of non-Indian courts, it will lose legitimacy both in the
eyes of other tribal members and many of those that argue for the preservation
of tribal courts. At the same time, the courts continue to provide significant
practical and symbolic possibilities for resisting the pressures of colonization
and encouraging the revitalization of Indian tribes. By co-opting western style
courts as vehicles for the enforcement of tribal visions of law, Indian tribes
can express and protect tribal interests and independence in a way recognized
by non-Indian institutions.
The ambivalent legacy of tribal courts thus presents tribes with
opportunities as well as challenges. In the next section, I discuss the ways that
jurisdiction over disputes involving nonmembers is crucial to exploiting this
opportunity.
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Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 Conn.
L. Rev. 1003, 1037-38 (1995).
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See Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions, and Fairness in the Navajo Courts, 76
JUDICATURE 15, 15 (1992) (describing efforts to incorporate Navajo common law); Justice
Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M.L. REV. 175, 186787 (1994) (describing peacemaker courts). It is difficult to determine the extent to which
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and the Peacemaker courts handle only a small fraction of the matters filed in the Navajo
courts each year. The “authenticity” of these efforts in the sense that they replicate the law
ways of Navajo people hundreds of years ago is less important than their reflection of current
Navajo ideas of justice and their success in creating a sense of ownership of law among the
Navajo people.
571
Justice Robert Yazzie elaborates on this theme in Watch Your Six: An Indian Nation
Judge’s View of Where We Are, Where We Are Going, 23 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
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IV. The Role of the Outsider in Tribal Legal Systems
The recent United States Supreme Court cases regarding jurisdiction
over nonmembers are colored by the assumption that the most important work
of justice lies in adjudicating disputes among those that are formally enrolled
in the community and that concern matters traditionally of unique importance
to the tribe. This assumption accords well with much political theory, which
tends to begin with an imagined community with fixed boundaries and has
less often grappled with questions of how community boundaries are drawn,
and the obligations caused by varying levels of community membership.
While there are, of course, exceptions,572 for much mainstream political and
legal theory the outsider is an exceptional case, troubling the polity and its
rules for distribution of goods and rights but not meaningfully contributing to
its development.573 In this section of the Article, I want to build on theoretical
work regarding the development of law, and draw on my own research to
suggest that this is particularly true for today’s Indian tribes.
Much of formal law everywhere is the product of conflict,574 a means
to address disputes to which existing norms and relationships do not provide a
resolution. Where informal controls, whether the pressure of clan relatives or
internalized moral or religious norms, are sufficient to regulate individual
behavior, there is little need for formal legal institutions.575 This is not
possible where a community includes diverse groups that do not share
common norms or relationships,576 or where external factors create situations
to which community norms do not present a clear solution.577 At this point,
formal legal institutions must step in, to draw on their institutional legitimacy
to resolve disputes in a way that will be respected by the community of which
572

For a broad based political theory that has always incorporated questions of membership,
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they are part. Thus, despite the assumptions of both opponents and some
advocates of tribal jurisdiction, in some ways it is precisely to address the
conflicts involving outsiders and, more broadly, changes brought about by
outside influences, that formal legal institutions exist.
Evidence regarding other tribal court systems supports this thesis. As
discussed above, Rennard Strickland discovered in studying the Cherokee
legal system of the 1820s and 1830s that disputes exclusively between
Cherokees arising from familiar tribal activities could more frequently be
resolved without resort to the courts, while the courts disproportionately
handled cases involving intermarried white men, and economic and social
disputes arising from contact with Anglo culture.578 In addition, much of the
work of the Indian police of the late nineteenth century involved controlling
non-Indians trespassing on Indian lands and game.579
My research regarding the Navajo Nation provides more evidence of
the importance of outsiders in tribal legal systems. As discussed in Part II, the
Navajo Nation has a high degree of insularity relative to most Indian tribes.
Culturally, demographically, and geographically, it is one of the tribes that
most closely matches the archetype of the homogenous and traditional tribe.
Despite this, 21.2% of the cases decided by the Navajo Nation appellate court
over the last thirty-two years have involved non-Navajo litigants. This figure
has little to do with the numbers of non-Navajos residing on the Navajo
reservation. For example, while non-Navajo Indians compose about 6.5% of
the reservation population and non-Indians compose only 3.5%, almost all of
the cases involving outsiders, 19.5% of the total cases decided by the Navajo
appellate courts, involve non-Indians. Cases involving non-Navajos, on the
other hand, compose only 1.7% of all cases.580
Table III: Percentage of Navajo Appellate Cases Involving Nonmembers
19711981198719921997Total
81
87
92
97
2003
Total
cases 25
24
24
16
20
109
involving
578
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more integrated in the social life of tribal communities. See Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup
Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Nonmember Indians, 38 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 70 (1991).
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nonmembers
Total cases in 147
period
Percent of cases 17.00%
involving
nonmembers

151

95

53

67

513

15.89%

25.26%

30.18%

30.76%

21.12%

If one looks at cases over only the last ten years, the figures become
even more striking. Since 1992, non-Navajos have been parties in over 30%
of the cases decided by the Navajo Supreme Court, and non-Indians have been
parties in 28%. It is not clear that this figure represents an increase in the
number of cases involving nonmembers, as during the same period the court
stopped publishing opinions decided on a summary basis,581 which might
increase the percentage simply by reducing the number of cases for which
identification of the parties is not possible, or filter out cases that do not raise
novel questions of law. It does indicate, however, that over the last ten years
almost one in three of the cases significant enough to require a publishable
opinion have involved non-Indians.
These statistics are a reflection of the reality of Navajo life. Even on
the Navajo Nation, the tribal community that looks most, in some ways, like
an independent state, neither the tribe nor the people are isolated from outside
influences. This interaction is reflected even in the clan system that is perhaps
the most central aspect of Navajo culture.582 Among the Navajo clans are the
Nakai or Mexican clan, and clans named after the Utes, the Zunis, and the Flat
Foot Paiute, all named for members of these groups that incorporated with the
Navajos.583
The Navajo people have incorporated elements borrowed from
Europeans and Americans deep within their culture in other areas as well.584

581

These include, for example, appeals dismissed for failure to timely file or dismissed
according to a stipulation of the parties. They also include a case I filed on my own behalf,
successfully challenging the Crownpoint District Court’s power to appoint me to represent
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The result is not a watered down culture, but instead one that is still uniquely
Navajo and that has enabled the Navajo Nation to survive and even thrive.
For example, although Spanish settlers originally introduced sheep to Navajo
agriculture, sheep have become an essential part of Navajo society.585 The
federal program of stock reduction in the early part of this century was a
flashpoint for anger at federal interference with Navajo culture.586 While
today overgrazing prohibits most people from making a living entirely off
sheep herding, many Navajos keep some sheep to supplement their income,587
and mutton is part of a traditional Navajo meal,588 and sheep wool is necessary
for the woven rugs for which Navajos are famous. Ownership and care of the
sheep herd are also deeply integrated in Navajo understandings of the world.
Sheep are used, for example, to teach children values of responsibility and
survival, and patterns of inheritance and division of sheep reflect and shape
Navajo ideas of property and descent.589 One of the required portions of the
annual Miss Navajo Nation contest (which, in contrast to non-Indian beauty
contests, does not include a bathing suit contest and emphasizes academic and
cultural accomplishment more than physical attractiveness) includes sheep
butchering. These and other fusions of culture have enhanced rather than
diluted the distinctiveness and cohesion of Navajo society.590
This interaction continues today. As the above statistics reveal, a large
number of Navajo business relationships are with non-Indians. Many Navajo
people living on reservations have been educated, lived, or worked in offreservation communities. Even when they live and work on the reservation,
change our concept of ourselves as Navajo.” Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in
Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 227 (1989).
585
See JOHN J. WOOD ET AL., ‘SHEEP IS LIFE’: AN ASSESSMENT OF LIVESTOCK REDUCTION IN
THE FORM NAVAJO-HOPI JOINT USE AREA (1982). While the 20 years between this study and
the present has probably reduced the percentage of Navajos involved in sheep herding, my
experience confirms that sheep remain an integral part of Navajo culture, even for people that
do not keep sheep themselves.
586
DONALD L. PARMAN, THE NAVAJOS AND THE NEW DEAL at 65-66, 77 (1976).
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Navajos will frequently interact with non-Navajos. Non-Indian mining
companies, such as Peabody Coal, and stores and customer service industries,
such as Basha’s Supermarket and Cameron Trading Post, are among the most
significant on-reservation employers.
Given the lack of economic
development on the Navajo Nation, moreover, most Navajos rely on offreservation businesses for their consumer needs. Navajo people and those
from other nearby reservations flood the off-reservation town of Gallup, New
Mexico on weekends, making its mammoth Super Wal-Mart among the most
successful in the United States.
Similarly, although the tribe is very aware and proud of its sovereignty
and separateness from the United States, serving in the U.S. military is an
important and honored part of Navajo life. As on most reservations, a
procession of veterans carrying the U.S. flag is a solemn opening to public
celebrations and fairs. Again, military service does not represent only a
capitulation to Anglo culture, but a celebration of Navajo accomplishments.591
Navajo code-talkers, who played an important role in World War II by using
the Navajo language to form an unbreakable code, are heroes not simply
because of their military service but because that service valued the unique
and formerly oppressed Navajo language.
The outside world influences ideas of law as well. If you ask a
classroom of Navajo students about the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights, you’ll
probably get blank looks; but ask them what the cops on TV say when they
arrest someone, and you’ll get a chorus: “You have the right to remain silent,
if you choose to give up that right anything you say or do can be used against
you in a court of law . . . .” And while the clan system retains significant
importance in Navajo life, it is no longer the primary source of property or
economic support. While property formerly descended through the maternal
clan and individuals depended on matrilineal relatives for support in cases of
divorce or death rather than on what Anglo society calls the immediate family,
today many Navajo people expect to inherit from their spouses and expect an
equitable division of property and future support in the event of divorce.
Mark Rosen, in his study of Indian Civil Rights Act cases in tribal
courts over the last 15 years suggests that a similar influence can be seen in
judicial decisions.592 While tribal courts are engaged in a process of tailoring
ICRA guarantees to tribal traditions and circumstances, they typically rely on
federal decisions as guidance in this process, and even when they do not cite
591

While many Indians voluntarily sign up for military service, the mandatory draft has been
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federal decisions or law, their interpretations often use federal constitutional
terms, such as due process, fundamental rights, or equal protection, suggesting
a deep integration of federal understandings of rights.593 Rosen notes that
even in Navajo Nation decisions that rely heavily on customary ways to
interpret ICRA guarantees, traditions are read through a lens colored by Anglo
legal understandings. Thus, in interpreting the due process guarantee, the
Navajo court derived the right to notice and a hearing from traditional
practices of resolving disputes by a collective decision at a public gathering
led by an elder statesman and attended by the wrongdoer, rather than rights to
collective decision-making or arbitration by an elder statesman.594
Mobility between on and off reservation communities has also shaped
the legal problems faced by the tribe. In the 1990s, for example, as the
influence of gangs and drugs was decreasing in urban centers, it was
increasing on the Navajo Nation as returning residents brought these things
back from the cities. The Navajo Nation is dotted with hundreds of open
uranium mines, leftovers from days when the BIA granted mining companies
almost unfettered access to Navajo lands.
The extended families that
formerly supported Navajo children are often scattered by the need to find
work elsewhere and by partial adoption of the Anglo emphasis on the nuclear
family. Federal policies of removing children from their homes and sending
them to schools that sought to generate shame in Navajo culture and language
have created generations that lack either appropriate family skills or
education, and that are firmly grounded neither in Anglo or Navajo tradition.
Exposure to Anglo ideas of the good life have also created conflict within
Navajo society regarding the extent to which Navajo ideals should be pursued
above the material goods valued by mainstream society. The point is not that
European American culture has been a boon to Navajo culture—indeed, one
could persuasively trace many current social problems to European American
influence595—but that it has importantly shaped the legal and social issues
facing the Navajo Nation and the range of cultural acceptable solutions for
resolving them.
a. Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers and Institutional Legitimacy
593

Id.
Id.
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Given this importance of outsiders to contemporary tribes, jurisdiction
over nonmembers becomes crucial in shoring up tribal legitimacy for two
reasons: first, so that tribal legal systems can address the everyday legal and
social problems of concern to Indian people; second, so that tribal legal
systems are perceived as respected legal institutions.
1. Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers and Utility of Tribal Legal
Systems
Given the interrelationships between Navajo and non-Navajo society,
jurisdiction over nonmembers is crucial in preserving the practical utility of
tribal legal systems. As the above statistics show, even on a reservation as
large and homogenous as the Navajo Nation a large portion of the commercial
actors are non-Indian. Non-Indians are the employers, the insurers, and the
merchants. They are the building contractors and the mining companies.
While the Navajo Nation, like other tribes, is actively pursuing economic
development, given the disparity in capital, experience, and education
between Indian and non-Indian people this need to turn to non-Indian
businesses is not likely to change any time soon. Nor should tribes or their
members be forced to rely solely on tribal businesses in order to ensure tribal
jurisdiction. This would impair tribal economies, discourage cooperation
between tribes and states and non-Indian businesses, and increase non-Indian
concern that tribes unfairly grant preference to their members.596
Without jurisdiction over non-Indian businesses, however, tribes lose
the ability to pursue uniform economic policies on their reservations or protect
their members in their interactions with outsiders. The Court’s decision in
Shirley v. Atkinson Trading Post597 provides a good example. The inability to
tax hotel guests at the Atkinson Trading Post did not undermine the taxing
ability or revenues of the Navajo Nation as greatly as it would for other Indian
nations, as the Nation is primarily composed of tribal and member owned
land. Despite this, Navajo hotel occupancy tax revenues dropped 15%, by
$181,179 in 2002, and are estimated to be reduced by $506,170 or 44% for
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2003.598 Its impact will be much more severe on most other reservations,
where much more land in non-Indian hands, and where these lands are the
most significant sites of economic activity. Eliminating taxing and other
economic regulatory jurisdiction over these lands would deprive the tribe of
the ability to set taxes with sufficient uniformity to be meaningfully enforced.
Governments have enough trouble getting compliance with their tax laws and
overcoming the perception that evading taxes is common and just. Imagine
the multiplication of this difficulty if your neighbors had no need to pay taxes
simply because of who owned title to their land. And while tribes seek to
invest in infrastructure to create a favorable climate for economic
development, without taxing jurisdiction they cannot force businesses on fee
land to contribute to the costs of this infrastructure. In the words of Navajo
Nation Chief Justice Robert Yazzie, “[t]he fee land businesses, for all
practical purposes, receive a free ride.”599
In addition, jurisdiction over nonmember businesses is crucial to
protect tribal members. Jurisdiction over contracts between tribal members
and nonmember businesses, whether those contracts are for employment or
for purchases of goods and services, seems firmly protected by Montana’s
consensual relationship exception. Encouraged by the Court’s recent cases,
however, non-Indian employers are increasingly challenging tribal exercises
of jurisdiction over them.600 Even if the consensual relationship exception
ensures jurisdiction where non-Indians employ tribal members, to the extent
that it denies similar jurisdiction over nonmembers it will encourage invidious
distinctions by both nonmembers and tribes. Non-Indian employers will have
incentives to avoid hiring or entering into business relationships with tribal
members to avoid tribal jurisdiction. Tribes, moreover, will be encouraged to
see themselves as legislating only for the protection of tribal members, as it is
only they and not the broader community of reservation residents for whom
their laws can be enforced.
The absence of jurisdiction also undermines tribal efforts to address
crime on Indian reservations. Lack of jurisdiction encourages non-Indians to
perceive reservations as places to flaunt disdain for the law and hostility to
Indian people. Oliphant and Belgarde’s actions—punching a tribal police
598

See www.navajotax.org/new_page_7.htm (reporting and estimated revenues collected from
various taxes) (last accessed 1/29/04).
599
Hearing Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Hrg. 107-338, 107th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Feb. 27, 2002) (written testimony).
600
See, e.g., Arizona Public Service Company v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1995)
(successfully challenging tribal jurisdiction to strike down company anti-nepotism law);
Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000) (challenging
tribal jurisdiction over action by terminated employee).

103

officer that tried to stop a brawl, engaging with tribal police in a high speed
chase--might be seen as examples of this. But even today non-Indians engage
in flagrant speeding across tribal lands, apparently relishing the perceived lack
of jurisdiction over them.601
A more disturbing example comes from statistics regarding crime
against Indians, particular against Indian women. The average annual rate of
rape is 3.5 times higher among Native women than it is for other ethnic
groups, and one in three Native women will be raped in her lifetime.602 But
while for other ethnic groups, most offenders are of the same race as their
victims, 90% of Indian women are attacked by an offender of a different
race.603 (In general, 70% of Indian victims of violent crime are attacked by an
offender of a different race, again in sharp contrast with the preponderance of
intra-racial violent crimes among other ethnic groups.) Although the federal
government has jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes to the extent they take
place in Indian country,604 it rarely does: the U.S. Attorney’s office declines
to prosecute 50 to 85% of the cases that are reported, and many of those it
does accept are child sexual abuse cases.605
The lack of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians thus creates a
significant practical gap in law enforcement, which may help to create and
perpetuate the high rates of interracial violence in Indian country.606 It
appears to contribute to a loss of faith in the efficacy of law on the part of
victims as well. While sexual assault is significantly underreported across all
ethnic groups, Native women are even less likely to report such crimes.607
Given the small chance that a successful prosecution will result, the choice not
601
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to report is understandable. But it too contributes to the general failure of any
legal system to address violent crime on Indian reservations.
2. Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers and Internal Legitimacy
Jurisdiction over outsiders is also integral to the internal legitimacy of
tribal legal systems, the extent to which tribal communities accept them as
valid institutions. This perceived legitimacy is of significant practical
importance to Indian communities, because it helps to dictate the extent to
which legal dictates will be complied with absent perfect surveillance or
application of force.608
This kind of symbolic legitimacy, of course, is not independent of the
practical efficacy discussed in the previous section. Perceived legitimacy
stems in part from very utilitarian concerns. If a legal system in general is
perceived to preserve safety, protect property, and contribute to prosperity it
gains the allegiance of the community it serves.609 Even where individuals
believe the exercise of the law to be ineffective or arbitrary in isolated cases,
the reservoir of belief in the overall utility of the legal system helps to ensure
compliance and respect. Where, however, a legal system cannot address
concerns of significant impact to the community, it loses both its purpose and
its legitimacy.610 To the extent that tribal legal officials cannot address the
everyday questions of law and order—to take examples from recent cases,
zoning, reckless driving on reservation roads, regulation of on-reservation
businesses, or searches of private property by law enforcement—they lose this
source of legitimacy.
Power over non-Indians is also crucial for reasons distinct to tribal
legal systems. As described above, western style government institutions
came to most reservations as a means of controlling Indian people. While
tribes often used these federal sanctioned institutions as a means to control
non-Indians poaching on their lands, in the minds of federal policymakers the
purpose of these institutions was to teach and assimilate Indians. To the
extent modern day tribal courts perpetuate a jurisdictional divide between
members and nonmembers, they confirm the opinion of segments of
608
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reservation populations that they are simply tools in a continuing colonial
project.
But loss of jurisdiction over non-Indians undermines tribal courts in
the eyes of all segments of reservation populations. Indian people, with a foot
each in reservation and non-reservation worlds, are not deaf to the message
sent by limiting tribal adjudication to them: Indian courts are inferior, good
enough for Indians but not for white folks. This message contributes to
mistrust and alienation from tribal courts and institutions among tribal
members. As John St. Clair, the Chief Judge of the Shoshone and Arapahoe
Tribal Court of the Wind River Indian Reservation, testified to the Senate
Indian Affairs Committee, “[t]his double standard of justice creates
resentment and projects an image that non-Indians are above the law in the
area where they choose to reside or enter into.”611 When the federal
government declares that the courts of subordinate tribal governments cannot
have jurisdiction over members of the dominant society, it cannot help but
undermine the legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of the communities they
serve.
b. Jurisdiction Over Outsiders and Institutional Fairness
The previous section focused on the importance of jurisdiction over
outsiders in ensuring that tribal legal systems are effective. This section will
focus on the importance of jurisdiction over outsiders in ensuring that they are
just. If tribal courts did not have power to adjudicate outsider rights, I will
argue, they would not be so fair. Despite the recent inroads into tribal
jurisdiction over outsiders, in many cases tribal courts will be the only fora in
which they can assert their claims. Fairness of tribal court systems, therefore,
is of significant concern both for tribal members and nonmembers.
1. Jurisdiction Over Outsiders and Conceptions of the Judicial Role
Somewhat counterintuitively, it appears that the best explanation for
the evenhandedness of the Navajo courts is the sense of self-importance held
by its decision-makers. Political scientists have long examined judicial “role
orientations,” or judicial understandings of the institutional role of courts and
judges,612 as one factor influencing judicial behavior.613 Particular conceptions
611
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of the judicial role may lead judges to depart in judicial behavior from
individual preferences, whether it is to cater to the needs of a particular
group,614 to attempt to strictly follow prior judicial precedent,615 or to defer to
other governmental institutions.616 Navajo justices’ conception of the court’s
institutional role appears to be a significant factor behind the court’s relatively
good track record. This conception, in turn, is importantly connected to the
scope of their jurisdiction.
As an institution, the Navajo court thinks a lot of itself. Its decisions
are replete with references to the important role of the court in providing a just
and distinctly tribal resolution to disputes that come before it, and its judges
traverse the country and even the world arguing for the preservation of the
courts and for the dissemination of the legal values promulgated by it.617
613
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This sense of self-importance is also evident in the one exception to
the general even-handedness of the Navajo Supreme Court. Where a litigant
challenges the inherent jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, the litigant is
probably going to lose.618 While in many cases the Navajo courts will cede
jurisdiction to another forum, whether in a child custody case because the
child was wrongly taken from another jurisdiction,619 an employment case
against a state school district in which the court deferred to the state courts as
a matter of comity,620 or a tort case where the litigant had already chosen state
worker’s compensation remedies,621 in each case raising the question whether
the Navajo Nation courts as a matter of inherent jurisdiction had the power to
regulate a particular dispute, in every single one the court held that it did, even
in cases in which federal courts might reach a different conclusion.622
This insistence on tribal inherent jurisdiction provides support for the
importance of Navajo justices’ role orientations in another way, by
discounting the importance of strategic motivations in their decisionmaking.623 The justices, it might be argued, rule in favor of non-Indians only
to avoid federal judicial and legislative restrictions on their jurisdiction. But
questions of jurisdiction over outsiders are among the few tribal court
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decisions that can always be challenged in federal court.624 While the justices
are keenly aware of their vulnerability to federal control,625 they apparently
choose to consistently rule against non-Indians in the one area in which the
federal courts may exercise significant control and even respond by restricting
their jurisdiction. This suggests that where role orientations and strategic
goals conflict, ideas of the institutional importance of the Navajo courts rather
than the desire to avoid federal control of their actions hold sway.
Rather than create incentives to despotism, this sense of selfimportance has only enhanced the institutional imperatives to ensure that all
litigants can be heard, and that decisions are not unduly influenced by factors
perceived as inconsistent with the judicial role such as political pressures or
the membership status of the parties. This sense of self-importance is a large
part of the reason that the Navajo court carefully scrutinizes the facts and law
before it and tries to rule justly in response. It is the reason that the court not
only often rules in favor of non-Navajo parties, but also a substantial portion
of the time rules against the Navajo Nation itself. It has led the court, with no
constitutional separation of powers, to construe Navajo common law and the
Indian Civil Rights Act to create a right of judicial review of governmental
actions.626 It has also led it to threaten to create judicial waivers of tribal
sovereign immunity until the Navajo Nation Council created a legislative
waiver.627
The deliberate effort to incorporate Navajo customary law has only
enhanced this concern for justice. In creating a jurisprudence of Navajo
common law, the court sees itself as expressing the ideals not of aliens or
colonizers, but of the Navajo people. Each articulation of a Navajo common
law concept, therefore, is a public declaration not only to Navajo people but to
the wider community, “This is the best of who we are.” Justice Robert Yazzie
once commented that the reaction to one of his speeches was “Yazzie is
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bashing the courts again.”628 But this kind of “bashing” suggests that tribal
judges will use the freedom to diverge from Anglo legal standards as an
opportunity not to lower but to raise the bar in protecting those that appear
before them. While tribal judges likely exaggerate the differences and
superiority of tribal over state and federal legal systems, an empirical study of
tribal court decisions regarding fundamental rights suggests that the results of
tribal court adjudication are at least as fair as those that would be expected in
non-tribal courts.629
Eliminating the power to adjudicate rights of outsiders, and to do so
with a relative degree of independence from outsider legal standards, would
greatly diminish this sense of self-importance. The jurisdiction of tribal courts
would then be radically less than state and federal courts, and the disputes
before them would not include many of those in which, I have argued, law
does its real work. The impetus to act in accordance with the role of the
judge, independent from immediate pressures and prejudices, would be
greatly reduced.
2.

Jurisdiction Over Outsiders and Grappling with Difference

Jurisdiction over outsiders may also enhance the justice of the courts
and the broader Navajo community in another way, by forcing judges to
consider and resolve real conflicts in Navajo society. Despite the claims of
some advocates of tribal courts that tribal traditional dispute resolution is
always just, both traditional tribal norms and modern tribal laws, like those of
any legal system, may reinforce unequal power structures.630 Tribal
communities are not homogenous—they are composed of men and women, of
traditionally powerful families and traditionally powerless ones, of those with
Anglo education and those with traditional education. Tribal politics and
laws, whether they reflect pre-contact traditions or modern developments,
may favor one group over another. Separated from the demands of the
broader community in which tribes are situated, uncritical valorization of
628
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tradition may prevent tribal communities from examining this inequality. By
continually facing litigants and contexts involving a wide variety of
perspectives, however, judges are forced to reexamine how traditional norms
and their modern iterations accord with the ideals and reality of the
community.
Anthropologist Bruce Miller notes this effect in his study of courts run
by three different tribes composed of the indigenous Coast Salish people of
the Northwestern United States. Miller found that the courts functioned best
when they had jurisdiction over subjects creating real conflict among tribal
members. So the Upper Skagit tribal court system, which was created to
regulate and adjudicate individual disputes regarding the fishing rights won by
the tribe in 1974 functioned much better than the South Island Justice Project
or the Sto:lo Justice Project, both of which were created to provide a forum
for supposedly harmonious and consensus based law ways rather than to fill a
meaningful distributive or punitive function.631 Miller concludes that “these
three cases suggest that it is a dialectical process, an interchange between
abstractions of past practice and specifics of current disputes, rather than
simply the contemplation of past practices, that enable tribal justice
institutions to become effective and acceptable to community members.”632
At the same time, the demands of outsiders may provide judges with
greater freedom to institute legal change than they might otherwise possess.
A significant criticism of tribal legal systems is that the small size of tribal
communities and the importance of clan relationships among community
members present an obstacle to objective resolution of legal disputes. This
obstacle may not be significantly greater than it is in small towns, in which
judges, lawyers, and parties typically know each other well. But the presence
of individuals not tied to the Navajo Nation by bonds of kinship and
familiarity may enable judges to revitalize legal rules to better respond to the
disputes before them.
One can see the value of the confrontation with difference in the
decisions of the Navajo appellate court. In several cases, judicial review of
cases involving outsiders has led to changes that tend to equalize Navajo
statutory law. As mentioned above, one of the statutes passed as part of the
Navajo law “reform” of the 1950s provided that while Navajo couples could
legally marry in a traditional Navajo ceremony, Navajos could only marry
non-Navajos in accordance with procedures conforming to state law. In two
cases, Navajos came before the court seeking validation of their customary
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marriages to their deceased non-Navajo spouses.633 In both cases, the court
refused to grant the petitions, citing the clear language of the statute. In each
case, however, the court expressed its concern with the law. In 1985, in
Marriage of Garcia, while refusing to validate the marriage between a Navajo
and a Mexican-American, the court declared that it was
impressed by the arguments of counsel for the petitioner which
recounted a history of non-Navajos adopting a Navajo way of
life and becoming a part of their community. One particular
example was Jesus Arviso, a man of Mexican origin who
became a Navajo leader. The Court recognizes the contribution
and importance of many non-Navajos but finds that the
provisions of the Navajo Tribal Code require it to affirm the
decision of the trial court.634
In 1989, the court called for change of the rule:
[S]aying that marriages between Navajos and non-Navajos can
only be contracted in compliance with state law, “allows
outside law to govern domestic relations within Navajo
jurisdiction. Such needless relinquishment of sovereignty hurts
the Navajo Nation. The Navajo people have always governed
their marriage practices, whether the marriage is mixed or not,
and must continue to do so to preserve sovereignty. [The law]
enacted in 1957, has outlived its usefulness.635
The Navajo Nation Council subsequently changed the law.
In 1999, the court considered a challenge to its criminal jurisdiction
over a non-Navajo Indian.636 The Navajo Nation sought to prosecute Lakota
activist Russell Means for the battery of his father-in-law, Leon Grant, a
member of the Omaha tribe and his brother-in-law, Jeremiah Bitsui, a member
of the Navajo Nation.637 Means alleged that because the tribe could not
prosecute a similarly situated non-Indian, jurisdiction over him was founded
in race and violated the equal protection provisions of the Indian Civil Rights
633
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Act, the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights, and the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.638 The court rejected the challenge. While it could have
relied on the federal Duro Fix to justify its jurisdiction, it chose not to, and
relied instead on the legal relationship with outsiders created by the Navajo
Treaty of 1868 and by Navajo common law.
First, the court found that the treaty language, interpreted as the
Navajo negotiators would have understood it,639 granted the tribe jurisdiction
over non-member Indians. It pointed to the concern of Navajo treaty
negotiators and the reassurance of the treaty commissioners that the tribe
would be able to accept non-members onto their lands and that those outsiders
would be subject to tribal jurisdiction.640 Second, the court pointed to the
Navajo common law concept of membership by voluntary affiliation:
While there is a formal process to obtain membership as a
Navajo . . . that is not the only kind of "membership" under
Navajo Nation law. An individual who marries or has an
intimate relationship with a Navajo is a hadane (in-law). . . The
Navajo People have adoone'e or clans, and many of them are
based upon the intermarriage of original Navajo clan members
with people of other nations. . . A hadane or in-law assumes a
clan relation to a Navajo when an intimate relationship forms,
and when that relationship is conducted within the Navajo
Nation, there are reciprocal obligations to and from family and
clan members under Navajo common law. . . We find that the
petitioner, by reason of his marriage to a Navajo, longtime
residence within the Navajo Nation, his activities here, and his
status as a hadane, consented to Navajo Nation criminal
jurisdiction. This is not done by "adoption" in any formal or
customary sense, but by assuming tribal relations and
establishing familial and community relationships under
Navajo common law.641
While a loss for the non-Navajo litigant, by overcoming the largely federallycreated distinction between enrolled members and non-enrolled residents the
decision created a tribally legitimate basis for incorporating non-members into
the Navajo community.
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More recently, in Staff Relief, Inc. v. Polacca,642 the court judicially
amended a Navajo statute to provide remedies to a non-Navajo. There, a nonIndian headhunter had offered a member of the Hopi Tribe a job with the
Indian Health Service, but then denied him the job after he had accepted and
moved to the area. Mr. Polacca sued the headhunter under the Navajo
Preference in Employment Act, and the headhunter argued that Polacca had
no standing to sue because the Act limited the right to file a complaint to
Navajos. The Navajo Supreme Court declared this limitation was enacted
“[f]or reasons beyond the knowledge of this court” and “rectif[ied] that
shortcoming by ruling that under basic principles of equal protection of law,
any person who is injured by a violation of NPEA may file a claim with the
Commission.”643 The court relied both on federal constitutional jurisprudence
declaring that a court might broaden coverage of a statute otherwise
constitutionally defective, and on the Navajo Treaty of 1868 that recognized
the power of the Navajo Nation “to admit non-Navajos to its territorial
jurisdiction and thus its protection, or to deny entry. Once an individual
obtains the right to enter the Navajo Nation, due process of law requires that
the Navajo Nation extend the protection of its law to all individuals.”644 This
decision may not have arisen purely from the court’s sense of justice. In
hearing the case, the Navajo Nation was surely aware of contemporary
challenges to tribal jurisdiction and tribal protection of rights.645 But the
decision was chosen by the court, and thus became an expression of
sovereignty and Navajo values rather than a resented intrusion of outside law.
In each of these decisions, we see the ways that allowing judicial
determination of cases involving outsiders enhances the fairness of the law.
By considering broad-based statutes as applied to the individual circumstances
of non-members on the Navajo Nation, the court is moved to criticize and
amend aspects of the laws that do not treat them fairly. By struggling to
understand the position of outsiders in the Navajo community, the court
recovers traditions in which members and nonmembers were not separated by
artificial legal rules. Far from permitting arbitrary control to the disadvantage
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of outsiders, judicial jurisdiction appears to reveal and correct some of the
arbitrariness of the position of outsiders in the Navajo community.
V. Conclusion
In the American imagination, Indian tribes function as the bearers of
history for a country uneasy about its lack of history, a symbol of tradition and
culture for a country struggling with its aggressive modernity. Supreme Court
jurisprudence has reflected and contributed to this image, emphasizing the
foreignness of tribal courts, and denying tribes the ability to shape their
negotiations with the outside world.
My findings suggest a need to reconceptualize tribes and
reconceptualize what jurisdiction over outsiders means for them. Just as the
Navajo people are importantly intertwined with non-Navajo society, the
genius of Indian tribes lies not in being living museums, but rather, in
adapting in the face of change to survive without losing their culture or
disintegrating as communities. Sovereignty must be understood in this light:
not as the right to stand still in a mythicized past, but as the power to change
so as to maintain and strengthen one’s community when many of the historic
bonds between that community have disappeared. The challenge of federal
Indian law, then, is to create an arena in which tribes can combine their past,
present, and future to create norms and institutions that can sustain tribal
communities.
Jurisdiction over those considered outsiders to tribes is crucial in
allowing this process to occur. It is precisely cases in which both worlds are
brought together that tribal courts best perform their community-building role,
by translating traditions eroded by generations of colonization into living rules
meaningful to the modern Indian community—a process Nell Newton calls
“reversing the politics of erasure.”646 Through determining the rules of
interaction between tribal members and nonmembers, tribal courts use the
institutional forms of the colonizer to reinvigorate the voice of the colonized
and make it heard. Were tribal courts limited to adjudicating the rights of
their members, they would lose their important role in defining that
sovereignty and ensuring its preservation.
At the same time, jurisdiction over outsiders is crucial in preserving
the fairness of tribal courts, both for members and nonmembers. Justice is not
created by ensuring that decision-makers have power only over those that are
just like them. Rather, it lies in ensuring that judges have enough pride in
their judicial role to fairly adjudicate the cases before them, as well as the
646
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opportunity to scrutinize laws and practices against a variety of perspectives.
In the tribal context, jurisdiction over outsiders, along with a measure of
independence in exercising it, preserves both this necessary institutional selfimportance and the impetus to examine tribal practices and ensure they
conform to tribal ideals.
Whether this jurisdiction will be preserved depends, in part, on
whether the Court maintains the assumptions that color the opinions of the last
twenty-five years. Because the Court has proceeded in a haphazard,
incremental fashion in depriving tribes of such jurisdiction, there remains
much that can be preserved in future cases. If the Justices continue to
perceive tribal courts as unfair, unfamiliar places, they will continue to bend
the law and ignore the facts to find that tribes have no jurisdiction over tribal
members. If they continue to perceive self-government as the power to
protect practices that are untouched by time and the outside world, they will
continue to read actions that touch on nonmembers as unrelated to the selfgovernment that the Court is bound to protect.
These questions are equally applicable to Congress. As the Court
continues to undermine congressional and executive efforts to support tribal
self-determination, tribal advocates will turn to Congress to correct this
judicial policy-making cloaked in the mantle of federal common law.
Congress, more aware of the contemporary realities of tribal life, has not
fallen into the same traps as the Court. But in considering whether to
statutorily protect tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Congress will need
evidence that this move is necessary and that it will not result in injustice to
those affected.
In the past, the Court has made decisions regarding jurisdiction over
nonmembers against a backdrop of untested beliefs.
This Article is a
beginning step in testing those beliefs and raising questions as to their
accuracy. It is hoped that it will contribute to the ongoing effort to create a
more informed basis for legal action, one that will fulfill the commitment to
tribal self-government embodied in federal law.
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